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INTRODUCING THE TOTALLY
UNNECESSARY BENEFIT LLC*
MOHSEN MANESH**
Unlike statutes authorizing benefit corporations, which have
been recently enacted in over thirty states to accommodate social
enterprises, no one has articulated a legal justification for benefit
LLCs. Indeed, no plausible legal justification can be articulated.
The expansive flexibility of conventional LLC law is already
perfectly amenable to social enterprises. Instead, the advent of the
benefit LLC, embraced most prominently by Delaware in 2018,
plainly reveals what was arguably already apparent in the context
of its corporate predecessor: that the aim of benefit entity statutes
is not law reform. Rather, it is about branding.
But the creation of this legislatively endorsed brand should raise
serious concerns. In the absence of meaningful accountability
measures to ensure that businesses embracing the statutory
“benefit” label actually deserve it, the state-sanctioned “benefit”
designation may be exploited by entrepreneurs to mislead the
public and compete unfairly with conventional for-profit
businesses. Moreover, even if statutory benefit entities do live up
to their “benefit” aspiration, they impose their own costs by
adding needless complexity to the law and exacerbating the
popular misperception that conventional for-profit businesses are
purely profit driven. It is hard to see why legislatures should
employ state power for private gain in this way, especially where
nongovernmental certifications already exist for socially minded,
purpose-driven businesses seeking to distinguish themselves in
the marketplace. Accordingly, this Article makes the case that
statutory benefit entities—both corporations and especially
LLCs—are unnecessary as a legal matter and unwise as a policy
matter.
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** Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. The author is grateful
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this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
The rapid proliferation of state statutes authorizing so-called
“benefit” corporations—starting with Maryland in 2010 and
expanding to thirty-four states by 20181—has been premised in large
1. See B Lab, State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/NZ7K-7ENQ]
[hereinafter B Lab, State by State].
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part on the assertion that conventional corporate law mandates
shareholder primacy.2 Under this legal mandate, the board of
directors of a for-profit corporation must manage the business solely
for the benefit of its shareholders. With the aim of maximizing
shareholder wealth as a board’s singular focus, concerns for other,
nonshareholding stakeholders, the public, and the environment are
irrelevant except to the extent such concerns implicate the
corporation’s profits.
Citing conventional corporate law’s mandate of shareholder
primacy, advocates of benefit corporation legislation contend that the
new statutory business form is a necessary and important addition to
the existing legal landscape—one that accommodates for-profit
businesses that are driven more by a social mission than a desire to
maximize profits.3 For these purpose-driven “social enterprises,”4 the
benefit corporation provides a legal framework that eschews
conventional corporate law’s narrow focus on shareholder welfare.
2. Shareholder primacy can be understood in two different ways: (1) that the sole or
primary objective of a business corporation is to advance the interests of its shareholders
(i.e., to maximize shareholder wealth), or (2) that shareholders wield ultimate power in
the governance of the corporation. See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose,
10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 184 n.4 (2013) [hereinafter Yosifon, Law of Corporate
Purpose] (articulating this distinction); see also J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own
Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 7 n.20 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, Choose Your Own Master] (same). This
Article uses “shareholder primacy” in the former sense (i.e., that “shareholder primacy”
means shareholder wealth maximization) rather than the latter.
3. See, e.g., FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND
GOVERNANCE: PURSUING PROFIT WITH PURPOSE 1–6 (2017); WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR.
ET AL., WHITE PAPER: THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION 7–
8 (2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FN9B-8FLC]; Bart Houlahan, Andrew Kassoy & Jay Coen Gilbert, Berle
VIII: Benefit Corporations and the Firm Commitment Universe, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
299, 301 (2017).
4. There is no single agreed-upon definition of a “social enterprise,” and there are
many different business models that might identify as such. See Alina S. Ball, Social
Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 926–30 (2016) (surveying definitions of
social enterprise); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L.
REV. 215, 223–32 (2013) (describing different models of social enterprise). Generally
speaking, however, a “social enterprise” describes “an entity that uses commercial activity
to drive revenue with the common good as its primary purpose.” See J. Haskell Murray,
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2014) [hereinafter Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation]; see also
Robert Katz & Anthony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 86 (2010)
(defining “social enterprise” as a firm that seeks “to [produce and sell goods and services]
in a manner that generates more public benefit or positive externalities than would a
conventional for-profit firm [and] . . . expressly measures its success both in terms of its
financial performance . . . and its success in advancing a social mission or addressing social
concerns”).
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Using benefit corporations, social enterprises may promote the
interests of various nonshareholding constituencies, the public, and
the environment, thus pursuing corporate profits more responsibly
and sustainably, without fear of shareholder lawsuits or director
liability.5
However appealing this notion of corporate altruism might be,
the legal justification for benefit corporations reflects a facile
oversimplification of conventional corporate law. Conventional
corporate law already enables purpose-driven businesses to pursue a
social mission, even if doing so might curb a business’s ultimate
profits.6
But even if benefit corporations are legally unnecessary to
accommodate social enterprises, the advent of benefit LLCs—the
unincorporated analog to benefit corporations—proves that the
question of legal necessity is ultimately irrelevant to the legislative
movement that is spawning these new socially minded business forms.
Benefit LLCs first emerged as a statutory business form in Maryland
in 2010, at the same time as the first benefit corporation statute.7
Unlike its corporate counterpart, however, the benefit LLC has
languished in the intervening years,8 largely ignored by other states,9
5. See, e.g., William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations
Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817,
819, 848 (2012).
6. See infra Section I.C.
7. See J. Haskell Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, 85 CIN. L. REV. 437, 437–38
(2017) [hereinafter Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?].
8. Prior to 2018, only three states had enacted statutes authorizing benefit LLCs:
Maryland (2010), Oregon (2013), and Pennsylvania (2016). See infra notes 205–09 and
accompanying text. In 2018, Utah followed by Delaware both adopted benefit LLC
statutes. See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text.
9. Instead of benefit LLCs, Vermont, followed by eight other states, enacted statutes
authorizing low-profit limited liability companies, or “L3Cs.” This novel statutory business
form was intended to accommodate social enterprises by facilitating program-related
investments from charitable foundations. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise
Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 543–46 (2016) [hereinafter Murray, The Social
Enterprise Law Market]. The poorly conceived legislation, however, did not comport with
the relevant law governing charitable foundations and, thus, failed to accomplish its
intended purpose. Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related
Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 246 (2010); J. William Callison
& Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will
Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures,
35 VT. L. REV. 273, 274 (2010); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The
“Emperor’s New Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 879, 895–98 (2010). Once the shortcomings of the legislation were widely understood,
state adoptions of L3C statutes ceased and one state—North Carolina—even repealed its
authorizing legislation. Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra, at 544; see also
DANA BRAKMAN REISER & STEVE A. DEAN, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW: TRUST, PUBLIC
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practitioners, and academics.10 But 2018 marked a significant turning
point for the fledgling business form due to Delaware’s adoption of its
own benefit LLC statute.11 Given that state’s unique importance in
the business law world,12 one can now reasonably expect legislation
and attendant interest in benefit LLCs to likewise flourish.13
Yet, unlike benefit corporations, no one has attempted to
articulate a plausible legal justification for benefit LLCs. No one has
suggested that conventional LLC law mandates any form of “member
primacy” or that conventional LLCs are somehow legally compelled
to maximize profits. Instead, the unanimous consensus is that
conventional LLC law already permits a business ample flexibility to
commit itself to balancing or even subordinating profits against a
social mission.14 Put differently, as a legal matter, benefit LLCs are
inarguably unnecessary.
Instead, the advent of benefit LLCs reveals that the animating
force behind benefit entity legislation has never been a desire for
legal reform. Rather it is about branding: the creation of a statesponsored designation made available to private entrepreneurs to
signal the virtue of their for-profit business to consumers, investors,
and the broader public.15
But the creation of this state-sponsored brand should raise
serious concerns about whether legislation authorizing benefit
corporations and LLCs (collectively, “benefit entities”) is an
appropriate or worthwhile use of state power. In the absence of any
meaningful accountability measures to ensure that businesses
embracing the statutory “benefit” label are actually deserving of it,
the state-sponsored “benefit” brand may be exploited by
entrepreneurs to mislead the public and compete unfairly with

BENEFIT AND CAPITAL MARKETS 62–64 (2017). At present, the L3C form appears to be
at a “dead end” and a cautionary tale for benefit entity legislation.
10. As of 2018, the only published scholarly article to focus specifically on benefit
LLCs is a symposium piece. See generally Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7.
11. See Act of July 23, 2018, ch. 357, 81 Del. Laws __ (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, §§ 18-1201 to -1208 (Supp. 2018)).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 59–62.
13. See REISER & DEAN, supra note 9, at 65 (“Delaware’s dominance in the market
for for-profit incorporations may not spill over into the hybrid form space, but one should
certainly not underestimate its influence.”); Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit
Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 83–84 (2017) [hereinafter Dorff, Why Public
Benefit Corporations?] (noting the influence of Delaware’s embrace of benefit
corporations on other states).
14. See infra Section II.B.
15. See infra notes 248–57 and accompanying text.
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conventional for-profit businesses.16 It is hard to see why legislatures
should employ state power for private gain in this way, especially
where there already exist private certifications available to socially
minded businesses seeking to distinguish themselves in the
marketplace.17
Moreover, even if statutory benefit entities do, in fact, live up to
their “benefit” aspiration, they impose their own costs by adding
needless complexity to the law and exacerbating the popular
misperception that conventional for-profit businesses are purely
profit driven.18 The unintended result may be that conventional forprofit businesses retreat from socially minded initiatives, resulting
ironically in a net decrease in the public benefit arising from private
enterprises.
Alas, state legislatures are unlikely to revisit their recently
enacted benefit corporation statutes any time soon. The benefit LLC,
however, presents a second opportunity to consider the rationale and
need for a new statutory business form catering to social enterprises.
A sober assessment suggests this seemingly innocuous legislation is
both unnecessary as a legal matter and unwise as a policy matter.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I
describes statutory benefit corporations, the legal explanation offered
to justify their existence, and the many frailties in that explanation.
Part II then moves on to statutory benefit LLCs, highlighting the
complete absence of a legal justification for them. Having
demonstrated that both types of benefit entities are legally
unnecessary to accommodate social enterprises, Part III makes the
policy case against them, focusing on the lack of accountability and
the costs associated with the state-created “benefit” designation as
well as the availability of private branding as an alternative to statesponsored branding.
I. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
The hasty adoption of benefit corporation statutes by state
legislatures can be largely credited to a single Philadelphia-based
nonprofit, B Lab.19 Before benefit corporations, B Lab was best
16. See infra Section III.A.
17. See infra Section III.C.
18. See infra Section III.B.
19. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 CIN. L. REV. 381, 382
(2017) [hereinafter Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law] (“The widespread adoption of
benefit corporation legislation and the influence of the Model [Benefit Corporation]
Legislation on that legislation are testaments to the successful efforts of B Lab.”); Murray,
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known for its private “B Corporation” certification,20 a designation
the nonprofit awards to socially minded businesses that achieve a
qualifying score on B Lab’s proprietary B Impact Assessment.21 Like
LEED certification for buildings, “B Corporation” certification is
intended to communicate certain virtuous attributes about a business
to various internal and external constituencies.22 Building upon its
private B Corporation brand,23 in 2010, B Lab promulgated the
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (“MBCL”),24 which first
conceived of the benefit corporation as a statutory business form.25
Section A describes statutory benefit corporations as envisioned
under the MBCL and its primary competitor, the Delaware public
Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 348, 369 (“The non-profit organization B Lab
has been the major force behind the passing of these benefit corporation statutes. . . . B
Lab has become a vocal, connected, persistent, and well-funded advocate for the Model
[Benefit Corporation Legislation].”); see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations:
A Challenge in Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1012–13 (2013) [hereinafter
Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge] (providing background information on B
Lab).
20. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1012–13;
Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 21–22.
21. See Michael B. Dorff, Assessing the Assessment: B Lab’s Effort to Measure
Companies’ Benevolence, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 515, 523–26 (2017) [hereinafter Dorff,
Assessing the Assessment] (describing B Corporation certification using the B Impact
Assessment); Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 149–51 (2016) (same). The B Impact Assessment measures a
business along four dimensions: (1) the extent to which the business’s prosocial
commitment is engrained in its internal governance, (2) the business’s treatment of its
employees, (3) the business’s impact upon the communities in which it operates, and (4)
the business’s environmental practices and policies. See Dorff, Assessing the Assessment,
supra, at 523–25.
22. See B Lab, About B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/whatare-b-corps [https://perma.cc/9LFR-ZP6U]; see also Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A
Challenge, supra note 19, at 1013; Tu, supra note 21, at 151.
23. In a recent interview, the founders of B Lab explained that, from the outset, their
intent with B Corporation certification was to build a community of advocates in the
business world to provide political support for benefit corporation statutes. Larry
Hamermesh et al., A Conversation with B Lab, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 321, 329–30 (2017).
24. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS].
As Professor Loewenstein notes, unlike other widely adopted model legislation, the
MBCL was drafted largely by one attorney, Bill Clark, for his client B Lab, and it did not
benefit from vetting by informed groups like the American Law Institute. See
Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 383.
25. Because B Lab chose a moniker for the new statutory business form, “benefit
corporation,” that sounds confusingly similar to its private B Corporation certification, the
statutory business form and the private certification are often conflated. See Tu, supra
note 21, at 143 (noting the persistent confusion between certified B Corporations and
statutory benefit corporations). Regrettably, both Certified B corporations and statutory
benefit corporations are both sometimes referred to as “B Corps,” which only exacerbates
the confusion. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 21.
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benefit corporation statute. Section B then describes the legal
justification asserted by B Lab and others for the new business form.
Finally, Section C synthesizes a significant body of legal scholarship
demonstrating that this asserted justification—premised on the notion
that conventional corporate law mandates unflinching shareholder
primacy—fails to withstand close scrutiny.
A. Benefit Corporation Statutes
Today’s benefit corporation statutes can be roughly divided into
two categories: those that follow B Lab’s MBCL and those that follow
Delaware’s lead. Although the two statutes have some important
differences, both share the same essential aim. Both statutes
authorize a new type of for-profit business corporation whose
purpose is not simply to maximize profits for the benefit of its
shareholders but instead balances profit seeking with the
advancement of “public benefit” or social good.26
1. B Lab Model
As drafted, the MBCL is designed to be embedded into a state’s
existing business corporation statute, adding provisions that authorize
the creation and governance of a new type of corporate entity—a
benefit corporation.27 Because it is merely a subtype of corporation, a
benefit corporation is subject to all other provisions of a state’s
existing corporation statute, except where those provisions are
modified or supplanted by the MBCL.28
Under the MBCL, every “benefit corporation shall have a
purpose of creating general public benefit.”29 “General public
benefit” is, in turn, defined to mean “[a] material positive impact on
society and the environment.”30 By mandating “[a] material positive
impact on society and the environment,” the MBCL statutorily
26. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101 cmt. (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (“This chapter authorizes the organization of a form of business corporation
that offers entrepreneurs and investors the option to build, and invest in, a business that
operates with a corporate purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value and that
consciously undertakes a responsibility to maximize the benefits of its operations for all
stakeholders, not just shareholders.”); see also Act of July 23, 2018, ch. 357, 81 Del. Laws
__ (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1201 to -1208 (Supp. 2018)).
27. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 101(a), 103 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/
sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS].
28. See id. § 101(c).
29. Id. § 201(a).
30. Id. § 102.
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enshrines the prosocial mission of every benefit corporation
organized under the statute.
In addition to creating “general public benefit,” a benefit
corporation may, but is not required to, identify in its articles of
incorporation an additional purpose of creating one or more “specific
public benefits.”31 In contrast to the mandatory “general public
benefit” purpose, the optional “specific public benefit” purpose
provides an opportunity for each benefit corporation to articulate a
more particularized prosocial mission that is focused and concrete.32
But the MBCL also makes clear that any “specific public benefit”
identified in a benefit corporation’s articles does not displace the
“general public benefit” purpose statutorily required of all benefit
corporations.33
To operationalize the public benefit purpose of benefit
corporations, the MBCL prescribes a standard of conduct applicable
to the board of directors, who are charged with managing the business
and affairs of the benefit corporation.34 Specifically, the MBCL
requires that the board of directors, in discharging its managerial
duties, “shall consider the effects of any [corporate] action or inaction
upon” a wide range of constituencies, including the corporation’s
shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers, the communities
in which the corporation operates, and even the local and global
environment.35
This statutory mandate is considered the “heart” of the MBCL.36
By requiring directors “to consider” the interests of not only
shareholders but also of multiple nonshareholding constituencies, the
MBCL expressly rejects any notion of shareholder primacy.37 Instead,
directors of a benefit corporation are statutorily required to place
shareholder interests on equal footing with the interests of other
corporate stakeholders, the broader public, and the environment,

31. Id. § 201(b); see also id. § 102 (defining “specific public benefit”).
32. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 74–75.
33. § 201(b).
34. See id. § 301(a); see also id. § 303(a) (applying the same standard of conduct to
corporate officers).
35. Id. § 301(a).
36. Id. § 301 cmt. (“This section is at the heart of what it means to be a benefit
corporation.”).
37. Id. (“By requiring the consideration of interests of constituencies other than the
shareholders, the [MBCL] rejects the holdings in Dodge v. Ford and eBay v. Newmark
that directors must maximize the financial value of a corporation.” (citations omitted)).
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with an ultimate aim of creating public benefit from the corporation’s
for-profit activities.38
Importantly, however, nonshareholding stakeholders have no
legal means of actually ensuring that the directors of a benefit
corporation do any of this.39 Nonshareholders have no say in who sits
on a benefit corporation’s board of directors.40 Nor do they have
standing to sue those directors to enforce the board’s statutory
duties.41 Indeed, the MBCL is explicit that “[a] director [of a benefit
corporation] does not have a duty to a person that is a beneficiary of
the general public benefit purpose or a specific public benefit purpose
of [the] benefit corporation.”42
Instead, like the directors of a conventional corporation, the
directors of a benefit corporation are accountable only to the
shareholders of the business.43 The MBCL does not alter the
conventional corporate law framework that grants shareholders—and
not any other constituency—the exclusive franchise to elect the
corporation’s board.44 Moreover, under the MBCL, only shareholders

38. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 70.
39. See id. at 94–95 (acknowledging that nonshareholders “have no voice” in benefit
corporations); J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV.
25, 44 (2015) [hereinafter Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports] (“[T]he vast
majority of stakeholders that the benefit corporation statute requires directors to consider
are relatively helpless in enforcing their rights.”). The lack of stakeholder power in benefit
corporations has been memorably described as creating a “separation of benefit and
control.” Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the Separation of Benefit and Control,
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1788, 1820–21 (2018).
40. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (providing that a state’s conventional corporation law governs matters that
are not otherwise addressed in the MBCL, like the election of directors by shareholder
vote).
41. See id. § 305(c).
42. Id. § 301(d) (emphasis added).
43. See Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A
Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 639–40 (2013)
(“[E]ven though it expressly disavows shareholder primacy . . . , the MBCL retains much
of the existing corporate structure by leaving ultimate accountability in the hands of the
shareholders . . . .”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 612 (2011) (“Shareholders of all benefit
corporations retain the informational, voting, and litigation rights of ordinary
shareholders.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right
Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 245 (2014) [hereinafter Strine, Making It Easier for
Directors] (describing this aspect of the benefit corporation movement as “incremental”
and “inherently conservative”).
44. § 101(c).
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have the right to sue the directors for breach of their statutory duties
via a lawsuit called a “benefit enforcement proceeding.”45
Rather than accountability, the MBCL offers nonshareholding
stakeholders a disclosure regime to ensure that benefit corporations
fulfill their statutory purpose. Specifically, under the MBCL, every
benefit corporation is required to prepare and make publicly
available an annual benefit report.46 In that report, the corporation
must provide a narrative description of the ways it pursued and
created general public benefit and any applicable specific public
benefit during the preceding year.47 In addition, the report must
assess the corporation’s overall environmental and social
performance against the standards of an independent third party.48 A
cynical mind will be quick to remember that B Lab, the architect and
chief advocate behind the MBCL, also provides such standards
through its B Impact Assessment.49 Indeed, the MBCL’s definition of
“third-party standard” is drafted in a way that “seems tailor-made for
B Lab,”50 although other third-party standards may also qualify under
the statute.51
Through forceful lobbying,52 and without organized political
opposition, B Lab has been enormously successful in convincing

45. See id. § 102 (defining “benefit enforcement proceeding”); id. § 305(c) (identifying
the benefit corporation and shareholders as the only parties with standing to bring a
benefit enforcement proceeding). A shareholder’s right to bring a benefit enforcement
proceeding is further restricted by the statutory requirement that the shareholder must
hold a sufficient percentage of the corporation’s outstanding shares. See id. § 305(c)(2)(i)–
(ii).
46. See id. §§ 401, 402(b).
47. See id. § 401(a)(1)(i)–(ii).
48. See id. § 401(a)(2); see also id. § 102 (defining “third-party standard”).
49. Although B Lab’s assessment tool is free to use by any benefit corporation, to
earn B Lab’s B Corporation certification, the corporation must earn a qualifying score on
the assessment, be prepared to provide B Lab supporting documentation, and, of course,
pay B Lab a fee, ranging from $500 to $50,000 annually based on the corporation’s
revenues. Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 518; B Lab, Certification,
CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/certification [https://perma.cc/X7Q5-66U5].
50. See Reiser, supra note 43, at 602.
51. See § 102 (defining “third-party standard” to be any “recognized standard for
reporting overall social and environmental performance of a business that is”
comprehensive, independent, credible, and transparent). Despite the fact that other thirdparty standards could qualify under the MBCL, in practice, B Lab’s standards appear to
be the most commonly used standards. See Winston, supra note 39, at 1804.
52. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 382 n.7 (describing
the author’s experience with B Lab and its affiliates in the author’s capacity as a member
of the Colorado Bar Association Business Law Section while considering benefit
corporation legislation); see also J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and
Statutory Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143, 159–63 (2013) [hereinafter Callison, Benefit
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states to embrace its no-cost, feel-good legislation.53 The first benefit
corporation statute, based on the MBCL, was enacted by Maryland in
2010.54 As of 2018, over thirty states have followed suit, adopting the
MBCL,55 although with some variations.56 And more states are
expected to join the bandwagon soon.57
2. Delaware Model
The chief alternative to the MBCL is Delaware’s benefit
corporation statute.58 The central importance of Delaware to
corporate law is well known.59 Over sixty percent of the Fortune 500
are organized under Delaware law.60 The state’s courts—especially its
Court of Chancery—have a national and international reputation for
sophistication in business law.61 And because so many businesses are
organized under Delaware law, the state has an enormous and evergrowing body of judicial precedent, addressing a variety of novel
factual and legal issues, giving the state’s law the perception of
certainty and predictability.62
Corporations] (describing the same and characterizing the experiences as “fairly
acrimonious”).
53. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 146 (describing B Lab’s
lobbying efforts as “well-financed and well-organized”); Brett McDonnell, Benefit
Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (the Existential Failing of Delaware), 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 282–83 (2016) (describing the political dynamics that have led to
the widespread adoption of benefit corporation statutes); Murray, The Social Enterprise
Law Market, supra note 9, at 580 (describing the political motivations for legislatures to
adopt benefit corporation statutes).
54. Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 97, 2010 Md. Laws 980 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to -08) (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.)).
55. See B Lab, State by State, supra note 1.
56. See, e.g., Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 31–32
(describing state law variation on provisions governing benefit reports).
57. See B Lab, State by State, supra note 1 (identifying several states in which benefit
corporation legislation is in progress).
58. REISER & DEAN, supra note 9, at 66 (describing Delaware’s statute as a “potent
rival” to the MBCL).
59. See, e.g., Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware
Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 865 (2014); William J.
Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2; Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1212 (2001).
60. Press Release, Jeffrey W. Bullock, Del. Sec’y of State, A Message from the
Secretary of State, https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ [https://perma.cc/MX5X-E3HM].
61. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 68 CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1077–78 (2000); William Savitt, The Genius
of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 570, 570.
62. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 59, at 1212; Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and
the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 189, 211–16 (2011) [hereinafter Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law].
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When B Lab approached Delaware to adopt benefit corporation
legislation, rather than simply embrace the MBCL, the state’s
lawmaking organs instead drafted their own legislation.63 The
resulting Delaware Public Benefit Corporation statute was adopted in
2013.64 Given Delaware’s influence in the business law world, it is
unsurprising that other states—including Colorado, Kansas,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Minnesota—have since adopted some or
all aspects of Delaware’s statute.65
Despite some technical and terminological differences—for
example, referring to benefit corporations as “public benefit
corporation[s]”66—the Delaware statute is largely in accord with the
MBCL. Similar to the MBCL, which provides that the purpose of a
benefit corporation is to create “[a] material positive impact on
society and the environment,”67 the Delaware statute states that a
public benefit corporation is one “that is intended to produce a public
benefit . . . and to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.”68
Likewise, the Delaware statute, in accord with the MBCL, requires
the board of directors of a public benefit corporation to manage the
business in a manner that accounts for the interests of not only the
shareholders but also all nonshareholding constituencies materially
affected by the corporation’s activities.69 Thus, like the MBCL, the
Delaware statute contemplates a for-profit business that is also
socially minded.
63. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 2–3, 86 (describing the deliberation and
drafting process in Delaware).
64. See Act of July 17, 2013, ch. 122, § 8, 79 Del. Laws 1, 2–4 (codified as amended at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (2016 & Supp. 2018)).
65. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 87 (identifying Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky,
and Tennessee as states following Delaware’s approach); Murray, The Social Enterprise
Law Market, supra note 9, at 553 (identifying Colorado and Minnesota as states following
Delaware’s approach).
66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
67. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (prescribing the purpose of a benefit corporation); id. § 102 (defining
“general public benefit”).
68. See tit. 8, § 362(a). Although Delaware’s statute does not use the expression
“general public benefit,” its open-ended mandate for benefit corporations to “operate in a
responsible and sustainable manner” is analogous to the MBCL’s mandate for benefit
corporations to pursue “general public benefit,” which the MBCL defines as “a material
positive impact on society and the environment.” § 102.
69. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2016) (“The board of directors shall manage
. . . the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the
stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct,
and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation.”).
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The chief deviations of the Delaware statute from the MBCL
relate to specific public benefits and the rules regarding benefit
reports. First, unlike the MBCL, under which the pursuit of a specific
public benefit is an optional purpose,70 Delaware’s statute mandates
that each benefit corporation designate in its corporate charter a
specific public benefit that the corporation will produce.71 The
requirement of a specific public benefit under the Delaware statute is
intended to provide more focus and guidance and, perhaps, create
more accountability for directors,72 as compared to the requirement of
general public benefit under the MBCL, which is defined so broadly
as to be arguably meaningless and, therefore, unenforceable.73
Second, the Delaware statute deviates from the MBCL’s rules
regarding a corporation’s benefit report. Under the Delaware statute,
a benefit report may be prepared biennially (rather than annually)74
and made available to the shareholders only (rather than made
publicly available).75 More importantly, the Delaware statute
dispenses with the MBCL’s requirement that a benefit report must
assess the corporation’s activities against the standards of a third

70. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS].
71. See tit. 8, § 362(a) (“In the certificate of incorporation, a public benefit
corporation shall . . . [i]dentify within its statement of business or purpose . . . 1 or more
specific public benefits to be promoted by the corporation . . . .”); id. § 362(b) (defining
“public benefit” to mean “a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more
categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than stockholders in their
capacities as stockholders)”).
72. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 91 (“[T]he requirement of specificity was an
acknowledgment that creating accountability with respect to broad public benefit was a
difficult proposition . . . . Though the specific benefit requirement does not relax the
general requirements, it does potentially supply a more meaningful opportunity to hold a
corporation accountable for public benefit.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra
note 4, at 355–56 (“Delaware moved in the direction of more directorial guidance by
requiring [benefit corporations] to choose a specific public benefit purpose . . . . [This] will
likely aid directors in decision-making and may . . . create some level of accountability for
directors.”).
73. See infra notes 264–68 and accompanying text.
74. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2016) (requiring a benefit report “no
less than biennially”), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a) (2017),
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_
17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (requiring “an annual benefit report”).
75. Compare tit. 8, § 366(b) (requiring a benefit report to be provided to
stockholders), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402(a), (c) (2017),
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_
17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (requiring a benefit report to be provided to
shareholders and made available publicly).
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party,76 allowing a board to define its own standard by which to assess
the business’s creation of public benefit.77 If a Delaware public benefit
corporation wishes to provide a benefit report annually, to make that
report available publicly, or to assess itself against third-party
standards, the corporation is free to do so.78 However, unlike the
MBCL, none of these things are mandatory under Delaware’s benefit
corporation statute.
B.

Legal Justification for Benefit Corporations

Advocates of benefit corporation legislation—whether pursuant
to the MBCL or the Delaware statute—have strongly emphasized the
legal need for the new statutory business form.79 Conventional
corporate law, B Lab and others have argued, requires the directors
of a corporation to maximize profits for the sole benefit of its
shareholders.80 This legal constraint—to privilege the financial
interests of the shareholders above all else—hinders socially minded
entrepreneurs from operating a for-profit business responsibly and
sustainably, in a manner that is attentive to the good of other
stakeholders, society, and the environment.81 This view of
conventional corporate law, as mandating shareholder primacy, has
been espoused not only by the advocates of benefit corporation
legislation but by many corporate law scholars,82 as well as some
jurists.83
Of course, no one can point to a statutory provision that bluntly
commands a conventional corporation to maximize the wealth of its
shareholders or otherwise precludes corporate directors from
considering or advancing the interests of nonshareholding

76. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c)(3) (2016) (allowing for an optional
assessment against the standards of a third party), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.
§ 401(a)(2) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%
20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (requiring an assessment
against the standards of a third party).
77. See tit. 8, § 366(b).
78. See id. tit. 8, § 366(c)(1), (3).
79. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 1; Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 851.
80. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 22–24, 26–29; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3,
at 7–11; Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 825–34.
81. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 (asserting that “[b]ased on the
established . . . legal frameworks, directors face legal uncertainty”).
82. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 157 (3d ed. 2015);
Yosifon, Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 183.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 103–06.
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constituencies. Indeed, no such statutory provision exists.84 Instead,
advocates of benefit corporation legislation commonly point to three
judicial precedents interpreting and applying the fiduciary duties
owed by the directors of a corporation.85 Advocates assert these three
precedents demonstrate that conventional corporate law commands
directors to advance solely the interests of shareholders or otherwise
face shareholder lawsuits and the threat of legal liability for breach of
fiduciary duty.86
The first precedent is the 1919 decision of the Michigan Supreme
Court, Dodge v. Ford,87 involving a dispute between the controlling
and minority shareholders of Ford Motor Company.88 To justify
withholding dividends from the minority shareholders, the controlling
shareholder, Henry Ford, argued that his namesake company would
rather use its surplus cash to benefit its employees and society more
broadly.89 In rejecting Ford’s assertion, the Michigan Supreme Court
announced:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself . . . .90
The second commonly cited precedent is the 1984 case Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.91 Seeking to avoid a
hostile takeover of the popular cosmetics company, Revlon’s board of
directors adopted various defensive measures, justifying them as
protecting the interests of Revlon’s creditors.92 In enjoining the
actions of Revlon’s board, the Delaware Supreme Court observed
that as a general matter, “[a] board may have regard for various
[nonstockholder] constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
84. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 947–49
(2017) [hereinafter Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization]; Yosifon, Law of
Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 185–87.
85. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 22–28 (discussing Dodge, Revlon, and
eBay); CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 7–13 (same); Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 825–
38 (same).
86. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 22.
87. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
88. See id. at 670–71.
89. See id. at 671.
90. Id. at 684.
91. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
92. See id. at 180–82.
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provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders.”93 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that
corporate directors are not barred from considering the interests of
nonshareholders (like debtholders), but those interests must be
viewed through a prism of shareholder primacy—namely, whether
advancing nonshareholder interests would ultimately benefit the
shareholders of the corporation.94 Even then, however, the court
added that in the unique context involving a sale or change or control
of the company, “such concern for non-stockholder interests is
inappropriate.”95 In that unique context, the court held the board has
a singular duty: “the maximization of the company’s value at a sale
for the stockholders’ benefit.”96
Finally, advocates commonly cite the 2010 decision of the
Delaware Chancery Court in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark,97 involving a dispute between the controlling and minority
shareholders of the online classifieds company Craigslist.98 The two
controlling shareholders of Craigslist took various defensive measures
to protect the company’s community-oriented corporate culture from
its profit-seeking minority shareholder eBay.99 In eBay, the chancellor
rejected the controlling shareholders’ actions, reasoning that
[t]he corporate form in which craigslist operates . . . is not an
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends . . . . Having
chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany
that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value
of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.100
B Lab and others argue these three precedents evince the reality
that it is a bedrock principle of conventional corporate law that a
corporation, and the directors who manage it, must solely pursue the
financial interests of the corporation’s shareholders.101 Any concern

93. Id. at 182 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985)).
94. See id.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
98. See id. at 6–7.
99. See id. at 6.
100. Id. at 34.
101. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 26–31; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 7,
11, 13; Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 825–28, 834.
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for nonshareholding constituencies must be “rationally related” to the
ultimate corporate purpose of maximizing shareholder wealth.102
Beyond these three judicial precedents, advocates point to the
academic writings of the Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice, Leo
Strine.103 In his extrajudicial capacity, the outspoken chief judicial
officer of the preeminent corporate law jurisdiction has made explicit
his belief that conventional corporate law requires directors to
manage a corporation solely for the benefit of its shareholders.104
According to Chief Justice Strine,
Despite attempts to muddy the doctrinal waters, a clear-eyed
look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within
the limits of their discretion, directors must make stockholder
welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken
into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder
welfare.105
In the same article, the chief justice adds that
Dodge v. Ford and eBay are hornbook law because they make
clear that if a fiduciary admits that he is treating an interest
other than stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an
instrument to stockholder wealth, he is committing a breach of
fiduciary duty.106
Taken
together,
advocates
argue,
the
extrajudicial
pronouncements of the Delaware Chief Justice coupled with the
judicial precedents of Dodge, Revlon, and eBay palpably demonstrate
that the central mandate of conventional corporate law is that a
corporation must be managed solely for the benefit of its

102. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
103. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 769–81 (2015) [hereinafter
Strine, The Dangers of Denial]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea
That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135 (2012)
[hereinafter Strine, Our Continuing Struggle].
104. See, e.g., Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 103, at 151 (“[A]s a matter of
corporate law, the object of the corporation is to produce profits for the stockholders. . . .
[T]he social beliefs of the managers, no more than their own financial interests, cannot be
their end in managing the corporation.”); id. at 155 (“[C]orporate law requires directors,
as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for
the stockholders.”).
105. See Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 103, at 768.
106. Id. at 776–77.
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shareholders.107 If the directors of a corporation fail to do this, they
risk shareholder lawsuits and personal liability for breach of fiduciary
duty.108 It is this central mandate of conventional corporate law that
advocates argue hinders socially minded entrepreneurs and
necessitates benefit corporations.
C.

Refuting the Legal Justification for Benefit Corporations

Despite the assertions advanced by B Lab and others, any casual
observer might be immediately skeptical that a new statutory business
form is, in fact, needed to accommodate social enterprises.109 After
all, even before the existence of benefit corporation statutes, one
could readily cite examples of prominent for-profit businesses that
ascribe to and pursue a social mission.110 Consider the familiar buyone-give-one businesses TOMS Shoes and Warby Parker.111 The fact
that these businesses—organized under conventional law—could
pursue an explicitly prosocial agenda suggests that benefit
corporations are unnecessary to accomplish this. Indeed, setting aside
the contested normative question about whether private, for-profit
corporations have a social responsibility,112 it is plain that as a strictly
legal matter, conventional corporate law already permits purpose-

107. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 26–31; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 7–
14; Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 825–38.
108. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 (asserting that “[b]ased on the
established state legal frameworks, directors [of social enterprises] face legal
uncertainty”).
109. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up on Traditional For-Profit
Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 800–01 (2018)
[hereinafter Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up] (concluding that “[u]nder existing corporate
law doctrine, theory, and policy, sustainable social enterprises have been, are being, and
may be properly and profitably formed, and may continue to exist, as [conventional
corporations]—even with the relatively new introduction of benefit corporations and other
social enterprise forms of entity”); Peter Molk, Do We Need Specialized Business Forms
for Social Enterprise?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW
241, 244 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018) (“[M]any firms that have now
converted to one of the new social enterprise forms first operated for many years as
corporations. And they were able to do so because corporate law has long allowed
corporations the flexibility to consider other constituents beyond investors.”).
110. See Tu, supra note 21, at 169–70 (citing several examples of prominent for-profit
businesses that ascribe to and pursue a social mission); see also Blount & Offei-Danso,
supra note 43, at 660–62 (citing additional examples).
111. See Tu, supra note 21, at 169–70 (discussing TOMS Shoes and Warby Parker);
Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 777 (2015)
(same). It should be noted that TOMS Shoes is in fact organized as an LLC but is
nonetheless mentioned here as a salient example of a conventionally organized business
committed to a social mission.
112. See Tu, supra note 21, at 127–31 (summarizing the normative debate).
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driven businesses to advance a social mission alongside or even ahead
of profits.113
1. Shareholder Primacy Is Not Required by Law
To begin with, state corporation statutes, including Delaware’s,
allow for the formation of a corporation for “any lawful business.”114
Thus, rather than dictating the purpose of a corporation to be the
pursuit of profits for the sole benefit of its shareholders, state statutes
expressly defer on the question of corporate purpose, allowing for the
possibility that a corporation might be formed for any sort of purpose,
including the pursuit of a social mission that might curb or conflict
with profit seeking.115 Admittedly, as a practical matter, corporations
must seek profit to survive.116 But corporation statutes do not
expressly contemplate the pursuit of profits or profit maximization as
a corporation’s sole or even ultimate purpose.
The commonly cited cases—Dodge, Revlon, and eBay—do not
compel a different conclusion.117 Dodge is an archaic decision that
today has dubious precedential value.118 Moreover, the decision’s
language regarding shareholder primacy is arguably dicta, and not
part of the court’s holding.119 Further, Dodge and eBay are more
appropriately understood as disputes between controlling and
113. See Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1007 (2009) (“[C]orporate law
contains no general requirement that directors and officers maximize shareholder profits
and only departs from this view in rare instances that should not affect most green
business decisions.”); see also Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 659–60 (arriving at
the same conclusion); Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up, supra note 109, at 780–87 (same);
Tu, supra note 21, at 131–41, 169–70 at (same); Winston, supra note 39, at 1813 (same);
Yockey, supra note 111, at 786–88 (same).
114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2016) (emphasis added); see also MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Every corporation incorporated
under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business . . . .”).
115. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70
BUS. LAW. 1, 13–14 (2014).
116. Id. at 10.
117. See Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 84, at 955
(concluding, after an analysis of the relevant case law, that “it would be over-claiming to
assert that U.S. state decisional law—any more than U.S. state statutory law—articulates a
clear, legally enforceable shareholder wealth maximization norm as a matter of
substantive corporate doctrine”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 10 (“State
corporate law does not require corporations to prioritize profits over competing
considerations.”).
118. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163, 167 (2008) (questioning the precedential value of Dodge); Winston, supra note
39, at 1812–13 (same); Yosifon, Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 188 (conceding
Dodge has limited precedential value).
119. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 12; Stout, supra note 118, at 167.
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minority shareholders, and, therefore, the judicial assertions in both
decisions as to the ultimate purpose of a corporation must be
understood in that specific context and not as a broader judicial
mandate that corporations must always maximize shareholder
wealth.120
As to Revlon, that decision applies in only a narrow and specific
circumstance: where the directors of the corporation have chosen to
undertake a transaction that will result in a “sale or change of
control.”121 Directors cannot be forced into a sale, however.122
Consequently, the applicability of Revlon’s shareholder-wealthmaximization duty is, in the first instance, optional—a choice that
must be made by a corporation’s board123—and not an inexorable
legal mandate.124 Directors may always elect to keep a corporation
independent to continue to pursue its social mission.125

120. See Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2025, 2039–40
(2013); Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 10–13; D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 315–20 (1998); Stout, supra note 118, at 167–68; Tu,
supra note 21, at 135–36; Gordon Smith, eBay v. Newmark: A Modern Version of Dodge
v. Ford Motor Company, CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 9, 2010), https://web.archive.org/
web/20100912123758/http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/09/ebay-v-newmark-a-modernversion-of-dodge-v-ford-motor-company.html [https://perma.cc/YYL3-B9Y6].
121. Although “sale or change of control” transactions are the most common types of
transactions that trigger Revlon scrutiny, Revlon also applies to two other categories of
end-stage “break-up” transactions. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d
1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994) (delineating four specific transactional triggers for Revlon
scrutiny).
122. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(holding that the power to defeat an unwanted acquisition proposal ultimately lies with a
corporation’s board).
123. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (holding that
Revlon applies only when a corporation’s board has elected to pursue a potential sale and
not when the board simply becomes aware of a prospective acquirer’s interest in a
potential transaction); Air Prods. & Chems., 16 A.3d at 129 (“[A] board cannot be forced
into Revlon mode any time a hostile bidder makes a tender offer that is at a premium to
market value.”).
124. See Air Prods. & Chems., 16 A.3d at 112 (“When a company is not in Revlon
mode, a board of directors ‘is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in
the short term, even in the context of a takeover.’” (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989))).
125. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained,
The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a
time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to
the stockholders . . . . Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989); accord Air
Prods. & Chems., 16 A.3d at 124 (quoting Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154).
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Moreover, even if decisions like Dodge, Revlon, and eBay are
understood to mean that corporate directors must always prioritize
shareholders’ interests, that does not mean that directors must be
solely concerned with profit maximization at the expense of all other
considerations. That is because prioritizing the shareholders’ interests
is not per se the same thing as maximizing the corporation’s profits.
Shareholders of any given corporation will inevitably have interests
that extend far beyond the profits of that corporation.126 Like all
humans, shareholders have a range of interests—some financial, some
nonfinancial, some selfish, and some altruistic—in the broader
economy, the environment, and their fellow humans.127 These
interests will, at times, necessarily compete with maximizing the
corporation’s profits. Therefore, if corporate law commands directors
to prioritize the interests of shareholders, that command may be
perfectly compatible with advancing the interests of nonshareholders,
even where doing so might reduce the shareholders’ financial return.
Finally, regarding the academic writing of Chief Justice Strine,
those extrajudicial musings have no legal force, even if the chief
justice’s personal beliefs are provocative and influential. Indeed, it is
not a coincidence that the chief justice has left it to academic articles,
rather than written judicial opinions, to espouse his views on
shareholder primacy. Because, as discussed next, even if cases like
Dodge, Revlon, and eBay are interpreted to mean that conventional
corporate law unequivocally mandates shareholder profit
maximization, conventional corporate law does not translate that
mandate into an enforceable legal duty.
2. Shareholder Primacy Is Not Enforced by Courts
Corporation statutes vest a corporation’s board of directors with
the power and authority to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation.128 In most cases, the board’s exercise of this statutory
power is protected from judicial or shareholder second-guessing by
the judge-made doctrine of the business judgment rule.129 Under the
126. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 86–89, 96–99 (2012); Paul
Weitzel & Zachariah J. Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the Inevitable Role of
Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 35, 41–42, 49–55 (2015); Winston, supra note 39, at
1817.
127. See STOUT, supra note 126, at 86–89, 96–99; Winston, supra note 39, at 1817–18.
128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
129. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law,
the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle . . . that the
business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of
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business judgment rule, in the absence of bad faith or a conflict of
interest, courts will not entertain a shareholder lawsuit challenging a
board decision that “can be attributed to any rational business
purpose.”130
As a consequence of the business judgment rule, in virtually all
operational decisions, corporate directors are afforded significant
discretion on how to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, without fearing a credible threat of judicial intervention
or personal liability.131 Applying the business judgment rule, courts
routinely defer to board decisions that may demonstrably cost the
corporation in the near term where there is any plausible explanation
for how that decision will benefit the corporation, and thus its
shareholders, over the longer term.132 Of course, decisions that
advance a corporation’s social mission are precisely the type that
would fall into such a category.133
directors. . . . The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free
exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a).”).
130. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); accord Aronson,
473 A.2d at 812–13. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 82, at 122–35 (explaining when
the business judgment rule applies).
131. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 126, at 29–31; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 770–76 (2005).
132. See Elhauge, supra note 131, at 772 (“[E]ven if profit-maximization were the
nominal standard, business judgment review would still sustain any public-spirited activity
without any inquiry into actual profitability or managers’ actual purposes as long as it has
some conceivable relationship, however tenuous, to long run profitability.”); Stout, supra
note 118, at 170–71 (observing that, under the business judgment rule, “courts regularly
allow corporate directors to make business decisions that harm shareholders in order to
benefit other corporate constituencies . . . so long as any plausible connection can be made
between the directors’ decision and some possible future benefit, however intangible and
unlikely, to shareholders”); Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 103, at 147 n.34
(“It is, of course, accepted that a corporation may take steps, such as giving charitable
contributions or paying higher wages, that do not maximize corporate profits currently.
They may do so, however, because such activities are rationalized as producing greater
profits over the long-term.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 140 (“[T]he discretion granted under
the business judgment rule effectively eviscerates the claim that corporation managers
must be driven by the sole goal of shareholder profit maximization.”); Yockey, supra note
111, at 787 (noting that because of the business judgment rule “no modern court has
overturned an ordinary business decision on the basis that it impermissibly put social goals
ahead of shareholder profits”).
133. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“When director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this Court will
not question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it
through making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and benefits,
or more general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—ultimately promote
stockholder value.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 303 (1999) (“[C]ase law interpreting the business
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To take one example, consider the decision of the
pharmaceutical retailer CVS Caremark in 2014 to stop selling tobacco
products in its stores134—a decision that predictably caused an
immediate drop in CVS’s retail sales.135 The company’s CEO justified
the decision, in part, by invoking CVS’s decidedly prosocial corporate
mission: for a business “dedicated to helping people on their path to
better health,” the CEO explained, “the sale of tobacco products is
inconsistent with our purpose” as a company.136 But the CEO also
justified the decision, in part, by invoking the potential for long-term
financial returns: “[R]emoving tobacco products from our retail
shelves further distinguishes us in how we are serving our patients,
clients and health care providers and better positions us for continued
growth in the evolving health care marketplace.”137
No one doubts that corporate actions like CVS’s decision to
cease tobacco sales would be protected from judicial scrutiny by the
business judgment rule.138 Consequently, even those who insist that
corporate law mandates shareholder wealth maximization concede
that the business judgment rule makes it virtually impossible to
enforce that mandate in court.139 Instead, they argue that the ability of
judgment rule often explicitly authorizes directors to sacrifice shareholders’ interests to
protect other constituencies.”); Elhauge, supra note 131, at 772 (“[I]t is hard to see what
socially responsible conduct could not plausibly be justified under the commonly accepted
rationalizations that it helps forestall possible adverse reactions from consumers,
employees, the neighborhood, other businesses, or government regulators . . . .”); Johnson
& Millon, supra note 115, at 11 (“[B]usiness corporations pursuing social missions at the
expense of shareholder value are [likely] to justify such policies with reference to long-run
shareholder financial interests . . . .”).
134. CVS Caremark, CVS Caremark to Stop Selling Tobacco at All CVS/Pharmacy
Locations, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cvscaremark-to-stop-selling-tobacco-at-all-cvspharmacy-locations-243662651.html [https://perma.cc/
JJQ4-SRKD].
135. Matt Egan, CVS Banned Tobacco. Now Its Sales Are Hurting, CNN BUS. (Aug. 4,
2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/04/investing/cvs-earnings-cigarettes/ [https://perma.cc/
Y5WP-2WX8].
136. CVS Caremark, supra note 134.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. See Joshua P. Fershee, The End of Responsible Growth and Governance?: The
Risks Posed by Social Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of Director Primacy, 19
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 376–81 (2017) (arguing that CVS should be entitled
to the deference of the business judgment rule even in the absence of any explanation as
to its potential for realizing value in the long term).
139. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 82, at 248 (“The court may hold forth on the
primacy of shareholder interests, . . . [but] directors who consider nonshareholder interests
in making corporate decisions . . . will be insulated from liability by the business judgment
rule.”); Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 103, at 776 (“[T]he business judgment
rule provides directors with wide discretion, and thus enables directors to justify—by
reference to long-run stockholder interests—a number of decisions that may in fact be
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directors to tacitly eschew shareholder primacy and advance
nonshareholder concerns is an “unintended consequence of the
business judgment rule.”140 But from a pragmatic perspective, there is
little difference between a legal regime that openly rejects
shareholder primacy and one that simply declines to enforce it.141
Nevertheless, one might point to cases like Dodge and eBay to
argue that, despite the protections of the business judgment rule,
courts do, in fact, sometimes enforce shareholder primacy.142 Indeed,
these cases do suggest an outer limit to the business judgment rule:
when directors openly renounce shareholder interests in favor of any
nonshareholding constituencies, they lose the presumption of good
faith and, therefore, the protection of the business judgment rule.143
But few, if any, business leaders would ever renounce their
shareholders’ interests because few, if any, actually believe that
socially and environmentally conscious pursuits are zero-sum
propositions that must come at the expense of shareholder returns.144
Instead, social entrepreneurs tend to believe that a prosocial mission
and for-profit activities create synergy—that socially and
environmentally responsible policies boost shareholders’ returns in
the long run.145 That is, after all, the social enterprise business
motivated more by a concern for a charity the CEO cares about, the community in which
the corporate headquarters is located, or once in a while, even the company’s ordinary
workers, rather than long-run stockholder wealth.”); Yosifon, Law of Corporate Purpose,
supra note 2, at 223 (conceding that the business judgment rule gives directors “near total
discretion” and, therefore, “it is nearly impossible to enforce the shareholder primacy
norm”). But see CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 12 (asserting that even in cases where the
business judgment rule applies, “resolution of litigation by a shareholder seeking
maximized financial return against the directors . . . would be uncertain at best”).
140. See Yosifon, Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 222–26; Stephen
Bainbridge, The Relationship Between the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and the
Business
Judgment
Rule,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(May
5,
2012),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-relationshipbetween-the-shareholder-wealth-maximization-norm-and-the-business-judgment-rule.html
[https://perma.cc/FSK4-9WF8].
141. Arguably, this assertion conflates a standard of conduct (shareholder wealth
maximization) with a standard of review (business judgment rule). See ALEXANDER,
supra note 3, at 38–39. But from a pragmatic perspective, the standard of review is far
more relevant to a director than a precatory, judicially unenforced standard of conduct.
142. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 12; Yosifon, Law of
Corporate Purpose, supra note 2, at 225.
143. See Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 103, at 147–48.
144. More cynically, one could argue that the reason socially minded business leaders
seldom openly renounce shareholder interests is that “[a]fter Dodge v. Ford, most . . . have
realized they need to tie altruistic motivations back to long-term shareholder value.”
Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 13.
145. See, e.g., YVON CHOUINARD, LET MY PEOPLE GO SURFING: THE EDUCATION
OF A RELUCTANT BUSINESSMAN 3 (2006) (“[B]usiness can produce food, cure disease,
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model.146 Thus, even if one reads Dodge and eBay to place an outer
limit on the protections of the business judgment rule, that limit is
trivial for directors bent on pursuing social or environmental goals.
Although the business judgment rule affords directors significant
discretion to advance nonshareholder interests, some have expressed
concern that in circumstances where the courts have held the business
judgment rule is inapplicable—especially upon the sale of the
company—directors are legally obligated to focus solely on
shareholder wealth.147 After all, as already noted, Revlon holds
unequivocally that where a board of directors seeks to sell a
corporation,
“concern
for
non-stockholder
interests
is
inappropriate.”148 Instead, “[t]he duty of the board [is] the
maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’
benefit.”149
But even this seemingly unequivocal duty is largely
unenforceable.150 To begin with, as already noted, a corporation’s
board cannot be forced into a sale and, therefore, is not inexorably
subject to the Revlon duty to maximize shareholder wealth.151 Even
when directors do elect to pursue a sale and, consequently, become
control population, employ people, and generally enrich our lives. And it can do these
good things and make a profit, without losing its soul.”); Hamermesh et al., supra note 23,
at 323 (“[O]ver the course of the 11 years [in business], over and over again, our
commitment to social responsibility proved to be not only the right thing to do but also
good business. We saw that show up in employee retention, relationships with our
suppliers, [and] relationships with our retailers . . . .” (quoting a founder of B Lab)).
146. See generally Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient
Truth of How the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623 (2007) (making the business case that socially
and environmentally responsible policies can enhance shareholder value); Michael E.
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism––and
Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 2 (same).
147. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 13. Aside from the sale context,
corporate boards do not enjoy the deference of the business judgment rule when
undertaking defensive measures in the face of a hostile takeover bid. See Unitrin, Inc. v.
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372–74 (Del. 1995). However, in the hostile takeover
context, relevant law already expressly enables boards to consider the interest of
nonshareholding constituencies. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955 (Del. 1985). Moreover, courts afford boards significant discretion in resisting an
unwanted acquisition proposal. See supra note 121–25 and accompanying text.
148. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. See Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 167, 217 (2014) (suggesting that Revlon is no longer “a legally enforceable
directive” but instead “a customarily adhered to but ultimately nonenforceable norm or
mere aspirational standard”).
151. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
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subject to Revlon, courts afford directors significant latitude in
determining the process and ultimate terms of the sale.152 Courts often
repeat the mantra that “there is no single blueprint that a board must
follow to fulfill its [Revlon] duties.”153 In practice, this mantra means
that, in the absence of a conflict of interest, courts will require an
“extreme set of facts” to hold directors monetarily liable under
Revlon for breach of fiduciary duty.154 More significantly, the
requirements of Revlon are inoperative where the sale of a
corporation has been approved by a majority vote of the
corporation’s shareholders155—even if it can be shown that the sale
failed to maximize shareholder wealth. The upshot is that courts will
almost never hold directors liable for damages under Revlon156 and
have little reason to even enjoin a proposed sale pending a
shareholder vote based solely on the premise that the directors have
failed to maximize shareholder value.157
152. See, e.g., C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation
Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1053 (Del. 2014) (“Revlon and its progeny do not set out a
specific route that a board must follow . . . , and an independent board is entitled to use its
business judgment to decide to enter into a strategic transaction that promises great
benefit, even when it creates certain risks.”); id. at 1067 (“Revlon does not require a board
to set aside its own view of what is best for the corporation’s stockholders and run an
auction whenever the board approves a change of control transaction.”); Lyondell Chem.
Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242–43 (Del. 2009) (“No court can tell directors exactly how to
accomplish th[e] goal [of maximizing shareholder value] . . . . [T]here are no legally
prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties.”).
153. See, e.g., C & J Energy Servs., 107 A.3d at 1067 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)).
154. See Lyondell Chem., 970 A.2d at 243 (quoting In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967
A.2d 640, 654 (Del. Ch. 2008)).
155. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015) (holding
that the business judgment rule, rather than Revlon, applies where a transaction has been
approved by an “uncoerced, informed stockholder vote”).
156. See id. at 312 (noting that Revlon is “not [a] tool[] designed with post-closing
money damages claims in mind”); Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger
Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 606 (2018) (noting that “deferential standards of judicial
review” in cases like Corwin has “[t]he net effect of . . . limit[ing] substantially the
availability of a post-closing suit for damages”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware
Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 337 (2018) (observing that Corwin “appears to
confine Revlon duties to equitable relief, except where there is egregious misconduct”).
157. See, e.g., Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312–13 (“[T]he long-standing policy of our law has
been to avoid the uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the
disinterested stockholders have had the free and informed chance to decide on the
economic merits of a transaction for themselves.”); C & J Energy Servs., 107 A.3d at 1068,
1070–71 (explaining that an injunction based on Revlon is inappropriate where
shareholders will have the opportunity to vote on the pending transaction at issue);
Johnson & Ricca, supra note 150, at 211–15 (“In recent years, the chancery court
consistently has refused to grant injunctive relief on Revlon claims in the pre-closing
context.”).
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So, in summary, although courts might sometimes use the
rhetoric of shareholder primacy, that rhetoric does not, absent
unusual or extraordinary facts, translate into an enforceable legal
duty. But even if conventional corporate law did mandate and enforce
shareholder wealth maximization as a legal duty of a corporation’s
board, as described next, that duty is at most a default rule. It is not
mandatory—not under Delaware law at least. Consequently, social
enterprises seeking to advance a social mission alongside profits are
already able to opt out of any perceived legal strictures imposed by
shareholder primacy.
3. Shareholder Primacy Is Subject to Private Ordering
Delaware’s general corporation statute, like the conventional
corporation statutes of other jurisdictions, is broadly enabling,
providing mostly default rules of corporate governance and
permitting entrepreneurs and investors significant freedom to tailor
those rules through the terms of a corporation’s governing
documents.158 As already noted, the Delaware statute expressly
authorizes a corporation to be organized for “any lawful business”
specified in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation.159 The
statute further provides that a corporation’s certificate may include
“[a]ny provision for the management of the business and for the
conduct of the affairs of the corporation . . . if such provisions are not
contrary to the laws of this State.”160 Pursuant to these statutory
provisions, a purpose-driven business may stipulate in its corporate
charter a social mission and elevate that mission on par with or above
profit seeking.161 Put differently, even if decisions like Dodge, Revlon,
and eBay are interpreted to impose a mandate of shareholder

158. See Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 847–55 (2008).
159. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2016).
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 663 (“Placing a social mission in
a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws to alert possible shareholders of the
specific obligation the corporation has undertaken to society is permissible and would not
offend corporate laws.”); Molk, supra note 109, at 245 (“[C]orporations can always amend
their charter to authorize management to include impact on non-shareholder interests in
their decision making.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 608 (“At inception, it appears
permissible to include charitable or social goals as part of a corporation’s purposes.”); Tu,
supra note 21, at 168 (“A traditional for-profit corporation could organize for the express
purpose of pursuing a specified purpose such as the pursuit or creation of a public
benefit.”).
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primacy, that mandate is merely a default rule that may be altered by
private ordering through the terms of a corporation’s charter.162
Some advocates of benefit corporation legislation have
questioned this conclusion,163 pointing out that any private ordering in
a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation is limited by the
statutory proviso that such private ordering cannot be “contrary to the
laws of this State.”164 The concern is that because shareholder primacy
is, in their view, enshrined in Delaware common law, any provisions
found in a corporation’s charter that purport to opt out of
shareholder primacy are “contrary to the laws” of Delaware.165
To be sure, the limitation on private ordering—that a charter
provision may not be “contrary to the laws” of Delaware—
encompasses not just the state’s statutory law but also its common
law.166 Yet, as already noted, nothing in Delaware’s statutory law
mandates shareholder primacy.167 And to the extent Delaware
common law does establish a rule that a conventional corporation
must be run solely for the benefit of its shareholders, the common law
“neither states nor implies any public policy indicating that [such a]
rule should be unalterable by charter provision.”168 Stated differently,

162. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on
Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 179 (2008) (arguing, from a contractarian
perspective, that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is merely a default rule of
corporate law that may be altered by private ordering); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547,
577–83 (2003) (same).
163. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 150–51; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 13.
164. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2016) (emphasis added).
165. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 150–51; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 13; see
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 971, 985 (1992) (“[S]tate law arguably does not permit corporate organic
documents to redefine the directors’ fiduciary duties. In general, a charter amendment
may not derogate from common law rules if doing so conflicts with some settled public
policy. In light of the well-settled shareholder wealth maximization policy, nonmonetary
factors charter amendments therefore appear vulnerable.” (footnote omitted)).
166. See David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit
Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 477–80 (2017) [hereinafter Yosifon, Opting
Out of Shareholder Primacy] (analyzing relevant Delaware precedents).
167. See supra text accompanying note 84.
168. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy, supra note 166, at 479 (citing
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985)); cf.
Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 84, at 958–66 (arguing that
Yosifon’s assessment on the validity of private ordering “merits credit” even though “[t]he
accumulated evidence is at best unclear about whether a [corporation] . . . can engage in
private ordering” to opt out of shareholder primacy); Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra
note 103, at 782–83 (“It may well be the case that a certificate of incorporation that said
that a for-profit corporation would put other constituencies’ interests on par with
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nothing in the common law indicates that shareholder primacy is a
mandatory and unwaivable rule for Delaware corporations. A
contrary reading of Delaware common law—as mandating an
unwaivable requirement of shareholder primacy—would be plainly
inconsistent with widely accepted characterization of Delaware
general corporation law among academics,169 practitioners,170 and the
state’s courts171 as broadly “enabling” and committed to “private
ordering.”172 Such a reading would also arguably conflict with the
express terms of Delaware’s corporation statute, which contemplates
stockholders would, in view of § 101(b), be respected and supersede the corporate
common law.”).
169. See Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws,
106 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 379 (2018) (“By virtue of its largely enabling structure, Delaware
corporate law is consistent with the private ordering approach.”); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1749, 1783 (2006) (“There has been a strong tendency in Delaware corporate
policymaking to broaden that room for private ordering.”).
170. See, e.g., Welch & Saunders, supra note 158, at 847 (“The [Delaware corporation
statute] gives incorporators enormous freedom to adopt the terms they believe are most
appropriate for the organization, finance, and governance of their particular enterprise.”);
see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, History Informs American
Corporate Law: The Necessity of Maintaining A Delicate Balance in the Federal
“Ecosystem”, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 204 (2006) (“Corporate statutes, like the
Delaware General Corporation Law, continue to take an enabling approach and allow
wide latitude for private ordering.”).
171. See, e.g., Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 2005)
(describing Delaware’s corporation statute as “an enabling statute that provides great
flexibility for creating the capital structure of a Delaware corporation”); Jones Apparel
Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 845 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine, V.C.) (noting
that Delaware corporate law “is widely regarded as the most flexible in the nation because
it leaves the parties to the corporate contract (managers and stockholders) with great
leeway to structure their relations, subject to relatively loose statutory constraints”); id.
(“Sections 102(b)(1) and 141(a) are therefore logically read as important provisions that
embody Delaware’s commitment to private ordering in the charter. By their plain terms,
they are sections of broad effect, which apply to a myriad of issues involving the exercise
of corporate power.”); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(Strine, V.C.) (“[Delaware’s corporation statute] is intentionally designed to provide
directors and stockholders with flexible authority, permitting great discretion for private
ordering and adaptation.”); In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings., Inc. Preferred Stock, 698
A.2d 973, 976 (Del. Ch. 1997) (Allen, C.) (explaining that “unlike the corporation law of
the nineteenth century, modern corporation law contains few mandatory terms; it is
largely enabling in character”).
172. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America
Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s
Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1260
(2001) (describing Delaware’s approach to corporate law as one that is “largely enabling
and provides a wide realm for private ordering”); see also E. Norman Veasey, An
Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate Law, 53 BUS. L. 681, 686
(1998) (“The Delaware General Corporation Law is an enabling act that provides wide
discretion to fine-tune intra-corporate arrangements.”).
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the primacy of a corporation’s charter in matters central to the
governance and management of the business.173
Thus, to summarize, a purpose-driven business organized under
Delaware’s conventional corporation statute is already authorized to
include in its corporate charter provisions that opt out of shareholder
primacy and instead commit the business to a social mission alongside
or even ahead of profit seeking. Benefit corporation legislation is not
and was never necessary to accomplish this. Of course, the same
analysis could also be applied to the corporation statutes of other
states.174 More importantly, however, as described below, most states
outside of Delaware have affirmatively rejected shareholder primacy
through the adoption of constituency statutes.
4. States Outside of Delaware Expressly Reject Shareholder Primacy
Even if shareholder primacy is an enforceable and unwaivable
legal rule under the conventional corporate law of Delaware,
Delaware is only one state. A business may incorporate under the
laws of any state, regardless of where the business actually operates.175
Under the internal affairs doctrine, the internal affairs of a
corporation—including the fiduciary duties of directors as well as the
permissible lawful purpose of the corporation—are governed by the
state of incorporation.176
Although most large corporations choose to organize under
Delaware law, all businesses have the option to incorporate
elsewhere. Outside of Delaware, thirty-two states have adopted socalled constituency statutes.177 These statutes explicitly authorize the
directors of a corporation to consider a broad range of factors

173. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (“The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided . . . in its certificate of
incorporation.” (emphasis added)).
174. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(authorizing a corporation’s charter to include provisions regarding “(i) the purpose or
purposes for which the corporation is organized; (ii) managing the business and regulating
the affairs of the corporation; [and] (iii) defining, limiting, and regulating the powers of
the corporation, its board of directors, and shareholders”).
175. See Kent Greenfield, Democracy and Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 135–39 (2004).
176. See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214 (Del. 1987) (explaining the
internal affairs doctrine); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM.
LAW INST. 1971).
177. See Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes
Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
765, 768 n.13 (2009).
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affecting nonshareholding constituencies when discharging their
statutory duty to manage the corporation.178 Some states’ constituency
statutes limit a board’s authority to consider nonshareholder concerns
to situations involving the sale or takeover of the corporation.179
Other states’ constituency statutes are broader, allowing a board to
consider the impact on nonshareholding constituencies in all matters
brought before the board.180 In either case, states that have adopted
constituency statutes have affirmatively rejected the notion that a
corporate board of directors must consider and pursue shareholder
interests only.181 Instead, such statutes expressly contemplate that, in
appropriate circumstances, corporate directors may account for
various nonshareholding constituencies.182
The existence of constituency statutes coupled with the internal
affairs doctrine means socially minded businesses are not inexorably
bound to shareholder primacy under Delaware law or the
conventional corporate law of any other state that is perceived to
mandate it.183 Rather, to the extent that the state of incorporation is a
choice, so too are any supposed legal strictures imposed by
shareholder primacy.184
Some advocates of benefit corporation legislation have criticized
state constituency statutes on the grounds that such statutes only
authorize corporate directors to consider the impact of their decisions
on nonshareholding constituencies, but do not compel directors to
actually do so.185 Put differently, constituency statutes permit, but do
not mandate, a prosocial, multistakeholder approach to corporate

178. See, e.g., id. at 782–83.
179. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.357(5) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. &
Spec. Sess.).
180. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 2019); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 516(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act 164).
181. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 14 (“Either expressly or by clear
implication, they reject the shareholder wealth maximization conception of management
responsibility, conferring broad discretion to sacrifice profits for alternative objectives.”).
182. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 9; Tu, supra note 21, at 137–38.
183. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 19–20 (“[S]ome state
[business corporation] statutes [citing the example of Oregon] already explicitly allow a
social or environmental focus. Social entrepreneurs seeking to use the corporate form
could simply incorporate in one of those states . . . .”).
184. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 556–58 (1990) (explaining how the “relatively low cost
strategy of re-incorporating” enables a corporation “to avoid [corporate law] rules that are
mandatory in state A, but optional in state B”).
185. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 136–37; CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at
10–11.
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governance.186 Of course, nothing in benefit corporation statutes
ensures that directors will actually consider the interests of any
nonshareholding constituency either.187 But putting that significant
shortcoming aside momentarily, some states’ conventional
corporation laws do, in fact, permit a corporation to make prosocial,
multistakeholder governance mandatory188—or at least as mandatory
as made by benefit corporation statutes.
Consider Oregon’s conventional corporation statute. Oregon’s
statute includes a typical constituency provision,189 but it also includes
a separate provision permitting a corporation’s charter to include
terms “authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct the
business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and
socially responsible.”190 By expressly permitting a corporate charter to
not only “authorize” but also “direct” the corporation to conduct its
business in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible,
Oregon’s conventional corporation statute already enables a
corporation, through private ordering, to adopt the basic governance
framework of a benefit corporation.191 Thus, if the justification for
benefit corporation legislation is to enable socially minded businesses
to opt into a mandatory system of prosocial, multistakeholder
governance, that too is already available through the conventional
corporate form without the need for a separate benefit corporation
statute.192
186. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301 cmt. (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (“In a state that has adopted a ‘constituency statute,’ directors are
authorized to consider the interests of corporate constituencies other than the
shareholders, but the directors are not required to do so.”).
187. See infra Section III.A.
188. For example, Pennsylvania’s corporation statute allows companies to adopt by
charter any corporate governance provision whatsoever. Black, supra note 184, at 555.
Applying Pennsylvania law, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a for-profit
corporation may pursue its owner’s religious objectives, even if doing so may limit profits.
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770–71 (2014).
189. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.357(1) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & Spec.
Sess.).
190. Id. § 60.047(2)(e) (emphasis added); see also Jason C. Jones, The Oregon Trail: A
New Path to Environmentally Responsible Corporate Governance?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
335, 347–50 (2009).
191. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 25 n.110 (noting “Oregon
[corporation law] has already made . . . explicit in its corporate statute” the ability to opt
out of shareholder primacy); Sneirson, supra note 113, at 1020 (“The ‘directing’ language
literally mandates that the firm be run in an environmentally and socially responsible
manner, like the B Corporation . . . .”).
192. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 442 (“[T]he legal
justification for . . . benefit corporation law [is] weak in states like Oregon that already
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5. Shareholder Primacy Is a Norm and Not a Legal Mandate
Given the foregoing, many scholars have questioned the purpose
of or need for benefit corporation statutes.193 Conventional corporate
law already enables the directors of a socially minded business to
promote the interests of nonshareholding constituencies and advance
public benefit. To the extent that the real-world behavior of directors
appears fixated instead on shareholder-wealth maximization, and not
advancing the interest of nonshareholders, nothing in conventional
corporate law compels this behavior. Instead, adherence to a principle
of shareholder primacy reflects a widely embraced, extralegal norm,
rather than an enforceable legal obligation.194
Admittedly, conventional corporate law does facilitate this norm
but not through any artificial restrictions on corporate purpose or
through directors’ fiduciary duties. Rather, it does so by affording
shareholders a privileged position within the corporate form.195 Only
allowed social and environmental purposes for its traditional corporations; technically
social entrepreneurs should have been able to achieve their legal goals with a traditional
Oregon corporation.”).
193. See, e.g., Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 16 (“[C]ertain social
enterprise proponents may have overstated the need for benefit corporation statutes, as
existing corporate law—whether through the business judgment rule, constituency
statutes, or express provisions in the corporate law of states outside of Delaware––already
provides significant protection to directors who choose to favor or consider nonshareholder stakeholders in their decisions.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 167 (“[T]he addition
of Benefit Corporations creates an overlap with traditional for-profit corporations where
both are capable of pursuing dual objectives of profit and public benefit.”); Joan
Heminway, Benefit Corporations: What Am I Missing—Seriously?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2015/02/benefit-corporationswhat-am-i-missing-seriously.html [http://perma.cc/28XB-NTPU] [hereinafter Heminway,
What Am I Missing] (“Social enterprise businesses form all the time as for-profit or nonprofit business associations. The lack of a benefit corporation statute has not impeded
social enterprise . . . and there is no proof a new statutory regime would encourage the
formation of desirable social enterprises.”).
194. See Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, supra note 84, at 950
(acknowledging that a norm of shareholder wealth maximization may exist “even if the
evidence may not permit a form conclusion that the norm has been codified as legal
doctrine”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 115, at 11 (“The profit maximization norm . . . is,
descriptively, a product of deep-seated business lore and practices, market pressures, and
professional education, not law.”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 17–
18 (observing that the “persistent common perception . . . that directorial duties require
placing shareholder wealth at the forefront . . . has arguably risen to the level of a widely
recognized and influential norm”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1619, 1643–44 (2001) (describing shareholder wealth maximization as a nonlegal norm);
Sneirson, supra note 113, at 1011 (“Perhaps more than the law or the market, norms instill
in corporate fiduciaries a drive to maximize shareholder profit.”).
195. See Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 103, at 766, 784; see also Blair &
Stout, supra note 133, at 288.
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the shareholders of a corporation—and not any other corporate
constituency—are enfranchised to elect the corporation’s board.196
Consequently, “directors cannot subordinate the . . . interests of
[shareholders] to that of other corporate constituencies unless the
[shareholders] themselves support that subordination.”197 If the
shareholders, instead, prefer to maximize corporate profits, then
directors will do so, not because corporate law requires them to do so
but because directors owe their continued employment as directors to
the shareholders who elect them.198 In this respect, to quote Chief
Justice Strine, “the power dynamics created by corporate law itself
dictate the ends of corporate governance.”199
Ironically, benefit corporation statutes do nothing to change
these “power dynamics.”200 Shareholders of a benefit corporation
enjoy the same privileged status as shareholders of a conventional
corporation, being the sole constituency empowered to elect the
corporation’s board.201 Rather than alter the franchise enjoyed
exclusively by shareholders, benefit corporation statutes tinker with
corporate purpose and directors’ duties.202 But, as demonstrated
196. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2016).
197. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My
Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176, 179 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Corporate
Power Is Corporate Purpose I].
198. See id.; accord Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age?, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 107, 144 (2014) [hereinafter Manesh, Nearing 30] (“If
directors myopically focus on the interests of shareholders, then it is not because corporate
law requires it, but because shareholders demand it.”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 194,
at 1644 (identifying “the fact that . . . only shareholders get to vote” as a source of the
shareholder primacy norm).
199. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement
for Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1165, 1174 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II].
200. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 94–95 (acknowledging that “a central
theoretical underpinning of the benefit corporation [is that] shareholders have an interest
in promoting the interest of all stakeholders and are adequate representatives for them”);
Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 850 (conceding that “the main policing mechanism for
the performance of directors is the right of the shareholders to elect the directors”).
201. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS].
202. The MBCL does contemplate that a benefit corporation may elect to have an
independent “benefit director,” charged with evaluating whether the business fulfilled its
statutory obligations under the MBCL to create public benefit and consider the interests
of nonshareholding constituencies. Id. § 302. Earlier versions of the MBCL required all
benefit corporations to have a benefit director; the current version makes the benefit
director entirely optional. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at
389. But even in those corporations that choose to have a benefit director, that director—
like all other directors of the corporation—is to be elected by the shareholders. See
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
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above, neither the law of corporate purpose nor fiduciary duties
compel unblinking shareholder wealth maximization. It is instead the
“power dynamics created by corporate law itself,”203 giving
shareholders the exclusive franchise. Without changing this
fundamental facet of the corporate structure, it is not clear that
benefit corporation legislation actually achieves anything.204 Despite
this fundamental reality, the “benefit” concept is now poised to be
unthinkingly exported into the world of LLCs.
II. THE ADVENT OF BENEFIT LLCS
The idea of expanding the benefit corporation construct to LLCs
is not new. As already noted, when Maryland adopted its first-in-thenation benefit corporation statute, based on B Lab’s MBCL, it
simultaneously adopted analogous amendments to its state LLC
statute, authorizing the creation of the first benefit LLC.205
Thereafter, however, only three other states embraced the idea of an
unincorporated benefit entity before Delaware’s move in 2018.206 In
2013, Oregon, like Maryland, simultaneously enacted amendments to
both its corporation and LLC statutes authorizing both types of
benefit entities.207 In 2016, Pennsylvania became the third state to
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55TSPDS].
203. Strine, Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II, supra note 199, at 1174.
204. As explained by the ABA committee that considered benefit corporation
legislation:
[L]egislation allowing directors to consider the interests of constituencies other
than shareholders does not, by itself, disempower shareholders. . . . The
shareholders of a benefit corporation who feel that directors are not sufficiently
attentive to the interests of shareholders would still have access to all of the
traditional tools available to shareholders with respect to changing the
management of the corporation.
Corp. Laws Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, Benefit Corporation White Paper, 68 BUS.
LAW. 1083, 1090 (2013); see also J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory
Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 61, 84 (2017) [hereinafter Murray, Adopting Stakeholder
Advisory Boards] (“While benefit corporation shareholders may be more socially inclined
than average, benefit corporation shareholders still have strong economic incentives . . .
and may pressure boards with the corporate governance tools at their disposal (such as
voting rights) to focus on the financial issues first.”).
205. See Act of May 19, 2011, ch. 500, 2011 Md. Laws 2955 (codified as amended at
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4A-1201 to -1208 (LEXIS through 2018 Reg.
Sess.)).
206. A bill authorizing benefit LLCs was also introduced in the Illinois state senate, but
the bill was never enacted. See S.B. 2358, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
207. See Act of June 4, 2013, ch. 269, 2013 Or. Laws 682 (codified at OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60.750–.770 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess.)).
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authorize benefit LLCs.208 And in 2018, months before Delaware,
Utah became the fourth state to enact benefit LLC legislation.209
The fact that more states have not embraced benefit LLCs with
the same vigor as they have benefit corporations is, in one sense,
puzzling. In many respects, the more informal and tax-advantaged
LLC form is better suited for socially minded entrepreneurs and
purpose-driven start-ups than the more burdensome corporate
form.210 One explanation for the failure of benefit LLC legislation to
be adopted more broadly may be the fact that B Lab has not openly
lobbied for it—at least not up until this point.211 A second explanation
may be that, in contrast to benefit corporations, no one has
articulated a plausible legal case to justify the existence of benefit
LLCs. Whatever the reason, with Delaware’s embrace of the benefit
LLC, 2018 will likely mark an inflection point, accelerating the spread
of this new unincorporated statutory entity.
Section A describes the extant benefit LLC statutes, including
Delaware’s. Section B then explains that, given the inherent flexibility
of conventional LLCs, as a legal matter, statutory benefit LLCs are a
needless novelty.
A. Benefit LLC Statutes
With Delaware’s new statute, there are now two competing
models of benefit LLC legislation: an unofficial B Lab-based model
and Delaware’s. The differences between the two models closely
track those highlighted above in the context of statutory benefit
corporations.212

208. See Act of Nov. 21, 2016, No. 2016–170, 2016 Pa. Laws __ (codified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8891–8898 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Act 164)).
209. See Act of Mar. 19, 2018, ch. 201, 2018 Utah Laws __ (codified at UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 48-4-101 to -402 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.)).
210. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 442 (observing that “most
social enterprises appear to be relatively small” and attracted to the “simplicity and tax
advantages of the [LLC] form”). Indeed, as Professor Ball notes, in Oregon, where both
benefit LLCs and corporations are authorized, there are more benefit LLCs than
corporations, which suggests the LLC form is better for small businesses. Ball, supra note
4, at 943 n.107.
211. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 444 (citing B Lab’s lack of
lobbying as the “main reason” benefit LLC statutes have not yet been widely adopted).
More recently, Professor Murray reports that Bill Clark, the primary drafter of the MBCL
and a B Lab affiliate, has commented positively on the expansion of the “benefit” concept
to LLCs in Pennsylvania. See id. at 439.
212. See supra Section II.A.
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1. B Lab-Based Model
Although B Lab has not promulgated an official model benefit
LLC legislation, that did not stop Maryland, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and Utah from creating their own by borrowing liberally from B
Lab’s MBCL and adapting it to LLCs.213 Thus, these states’ statutes
represent an unofficial B Lab model for benefit LLCs.
Each state’s benefit LLC statute largely parrots the language of
the MBCL, including the statutorily required purpose of creating
general public benefit214 and the optional purpose of creating a
specific public benefit.215 Likewise, consistent with the MBCL, each
state’s statute requires that those vested with the power to manage an
LLC—members in a member-managed LLC and managers in a
manager-managed LLC216—to “consider” the interests of not just the
LLC’s members but the same list of various nonmember
constituencies that may be affected by the company’s activities.217
Finally, each state’s statute requires a benefit LLC to prepare and
make publicly available an annual benefit report, assessing the
performance of the LLC against the standards of an independent
third party.218
213. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 439 (observing that the
Oregon and Maryland benefit LLC statutes “largely follow” the MBCL as adopted by
each state).
214. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-1206(a) (LEXIS through 2018
Reg. Sess.), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.758(1) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. &
Spec. Sess.), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8894(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.
Act 164), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-4-201(1) (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.), with
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55TSPDS].
215. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-1206(b) (LEXIS through 2018
Reg. Sess.), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.758(2)(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. &
Spec. Sess.), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8894(b) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.
Act 164), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-4-201(2)(a) (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.),
with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55TSPDS].
216. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006).
217. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-1207(a) (LEXIS through 2018
Reg. Sess.), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.760(1) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. &
Spec. Sess.), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8895(a), 8896(a) (Westlaw through 2018
Reg. Sess. Act 164), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-4-301 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec.
Sess.), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS].
218. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-1208 (LEXIS through 2018
Reg. Sess.), and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.768, 60.770 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.
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2. Delaware Model
Unsurprisingly, Delaware’s new benefit LLC statute is based on
its own benefit corporation statute rather than on B Lab’s MBCL.
Thus, the differences between Delaware’s benefit LLC statute and
the unofficial B Lab model are largely the same as those described
earlier in the context of benefit corporations.219
In particular, unlike the B Lab model and consistent with
Delaware’s statute governing benefit corporations, Delaware’s new
benefit LLC statute requires a benefit LLC to designate in its
formation document a specific public benefit to be promoted by the
LLC.220 Thus, like a Delaware benefit corporation, a Delaware
benefit LLC must pursue both general public benefit221 and whatever
specific public benefit that has been identified by the LLC.222
Moreover, unlike the B Lab model, the Delaware benefit LLC
statute requires a benefit LLC to produce a benefit report only
biennially (and not annually)223 and to make that report available only
to its members (and not publicly).224 Finally, like Delaware’s benefit
& Spec. Sess.), and 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8898 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.
Act 164), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-4-401 (LEXIS through 2018 3d Spec. Sess.), with
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401, 402 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55TSPDS].
219. See supra notes 70–78 and accompanying text.
220. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1202(a) (Supp. 2018) (requiring a benefit
LLC to identify at least one specific public benefit in its certificate of formation), and id.
tit. 8, § 362(a)(1) (2016) (requiring the same of a benefit corporation), with MODEL
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS]
(providing that a specific public benefit is optional).
221. Compare tit. 6, § 18-1202(a) (requiring a benefit LLC “to operate in a responsible
and sustainable manner”), with id. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2016) (requiring the same of a benefit
corporation). As already noted, the mandate “to operate in a responsible and sustainable
manner” is analogous to the “general public benefit” mandate under the MBCL. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
222. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1202(a), (b) (Supp. 2018) (requiring a benefit
LLC “produce public benefit” and defining “public benefit” to mean “a positive effect (or
reduction of negative effects) on one or more categories of persons, entities, communities
or interests (other than members in their capacities as members)”).
223. Compare tit. 6, § 18-1205 (requiring a benefit report biennially), with MODEL
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%
20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (requiring
an annual benefit report).
224. Compare tit. 6, § 18-1205 (requiring a benefit report to be provided to the
members), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (requiring a benefit report to be provided to shareholders and made
available publicly).
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corporation statute, the state’s new benefit LLC statute does not
require a benefit report to assess the LLC’s activities against the
standards of an independent third party.225
Although no other state has yet followed the Delaware benefit
LLC model, with Delaware’s imprimatur, interest in the new
unincorporated statutory form is likely to spread. And especially in
those states that have already followed Delaware’s public benefit
corporation statute, one might reasonably expect to see the adoption
of statutes authorizing analogous benefit LLCs modeled on
Delaware’s new statute. Yet, as the discussion below shows, there is
no credible legal case to justify the existence of this new socially
minded statutory business entity.
B.

Nonexistent Legal Justification for Benefit LLCs

As already explained, the legal case for benefit corporations is
quite thin.226 It is premised upon the dubious assertion that
conventional corporate law inexorably mandates shareholder
primacy, thus precluding purpose-driven social enterprises from
utilizing the conventional corporate form to pursue a social agenda
that might curb profits.
Even if one accepts this dubious assertion, however, there is no
similar justification that can be made in support of benefit LLCs.227
No one has suggested that conventional LLC law mandates any form
of “member primacy.” No one believes that conventional LLCs are
legally committed to maximizing profits for the sole benefit of an
LLC’s members.
Instead, conventional LLC law allows for virtually unlimited
flexibility as to the purpose and governance of the entity and, thus, is
perfectly suitable for social enterprises.228 For example, conventional
225. Compare tit. 6, § 18-1205 (omitting any requirement for a benefit LLC to assess
itself against the standards of a third party), with id. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2016) (omitting the
same requirement in the benefit corporation context).
226. See supra Section I.C.
227. Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 448–49 (“[T]he legal
justification for the benefit LLC is even weaker than the legal justification for the benefit
corporation . . . .”).
228. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 154–55 (acknowledging that because “the LLC
structure is sufficiently flexible to create a benefit corporation-like arrangement through
private ordering,” statutory benefit LLCs “might not be necessary”); Cassady V. Brewer,
A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (A/K/A “Social
Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 680 (2012) (“Because of their inherent
contract-like flexibility, liability protection, and malleable tax treatment, limited liability
companies are increasingly being used for social enterprise.”); Brett H. McDonnell,
Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20
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LLC statutes, including Delaware’s, provide that an LLC “may carry
on any lawful business, purpose or activity, whether or not for
profit,”229 thereby expressly contemplating that the pursuit of profits
may not even be a goal of an LLC. Indeed, the use of conventional
LLCs for purely philanthropic purposes is growing in popularity,230
and there is no question a conventional LLC could also be structured
to accommodate a for-profit social enterprise.231
It is true that the individuals who manage the business and affairs
of an LLC are bound by traditional fiduciary duties,232 and those
duties largely mirror the fiduciary duties of corporate directors.233
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 26–27 (2014) (observing that the flexibility of the LLC
form “provide[s] a viable alternative for social enterprises”); Molk, supra note 109, at 248
(“LLCs certainly appear capable of providing the legal framework to pursue social
enterprise . . . .”); Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 441–42 (“By design,
LLCs are extremely flexible, contract-based, and already perfectly able to mold to a social
entrepreneur’s desires. The availability of the traditional LLC form renders the addition
of the benefit LLC largely superfluous.”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note
2, at 19 (“[LLCs] are famously flexible, and operating agreements can be altered to meet
the needs of social entrepreneurs.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 608 (“Typically, LLC law
will be flexible enough to allow adoption of both profit and social purposes . . . .”); see also
Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 816 (2012) (arguing that
Delaware LLCs are the best statutory business entity for social enterprises).
229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-106(a) (2016) (emphasis added); accord REVISED
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 104(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2006) (“A limited liability company may have any lawful purpose, regardless of
whether for profit.”).
230. See Cassady V. Brewer, Lisa A. Runquist & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, Nonprofit
LLCs, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar. 2017, at 1, 3. Most famously, Mark Zuckerberg, the founder
and CEO of Facebook, Inc., and his spouse, a medical doctor, launched the philanthropic
Chan-Zuckerberg Initiative, which is organized as a conventional Delaware LLC. See
Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Zuckerberg’s Philanthropy Uses L.L.C. for More Control,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, at B1. The Initiative describes itself as “a new kind of
philanthropic organization that brings together world-class engineering, grant-making,
impact investing, policy, and advocacy work” with a focus on “supporting science through
basic biomedical research and education through personalized learning” and “equal
opportunity including access to affordable housing and criminal justice reform.” See
About, CHAN ZUCKERBERG INITIATIVE, https://www.chanzuckerberg.com/about
[https://perma.cc/879B-W9H7].
231. See, e.g., Molk, supra note 109, at 247 (“LLCs enjoy almost limitless freedom to
craft their operating agreements; language that requires adherence to social enterprise
objectives should not be a problem.”).
232. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (codifying fiduciary duties under LLC law);
Mohsen Manesh, Equity in LLC Law?, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 93, 101 (2016) [hereinafter
Manesh, Equity in LLC Law?] (summarizing fiduciary duties under Delaware LLC law).
233. See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850–51, 855 n.65
(Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012) (analogizing the fiduciary
duties owed in the corporate context to the fiduciary duties owed in a manager-managed
LLC); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(b)–(c) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
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Thus, in theory, one might be concerned that courts, borrowing from
corporate law, will import analogous concepts of “member primacy”
and “member wealth maximization” into LLCs.234 Unlike corporation
statutes, however, LLC statutes are quite explicit that fiduciary duties
may be contractually modified or even eliminated.235 Indeed, every
matter of internal governance—from the purpose of an LLC to who
can make decisions and take actions on behalf of the entity, to the
process that must be undertaken, and the constituencies to be
considered in making any decision on behalf of an LLC—may be
contractually specified in the terms of an LLC’s operating
agreement.236 To emphasize this point, Delaware’s LLC statute
famously proclaims as its guiding policy “to give the maximum effect
to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of
[LLC] agreements.”237
Nonetheless, one might be concerned that the contractual
flexibility afforded under LLC law works in both directions: that the
terms in an LLC’s operating agreement committing the entity to
pursue public benefit may be later amended by the members of the
LLC. Thus, unlike the mandatory rules set forth in a benefit LLC
statute, the terms of an operating agreement cannot credibly commit
a conventional LLC to a prosocial agenda. But this concern is
groundless. First, a business formed as a benefit LLC can already,
with the approval of a requisite majority of its members, convert itself
into a conventional LLC, thus abandoning the statutory mandate to
pursue public benefit.238 Second, conventional LLC law affords
members the flexibility to stipulate certain terms of an operating
agreement (for example, those committing the LLC to pursue public
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (codifying fiduciary duties of loyalty and care
under LLC law).
234. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 438 (stating that some
drafters of Oregon’s benefit LLC statute were motivated, in part, “to combat any future
common law creep from the corporation-focused case of eBay into the LLC area”).
235. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (Supp. 2018) (“To the extent that, at law
or in equity, a member or manager . . . has duties (including fiduciary duties) . . . the
member’s or manager’s . . . duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by
provisions in the limited liability company agreement . . . .”); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB.
CO. ACT § 110(d) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006)
(authorizing an LLC operating agreement to restrict, alter, or event eliminate fiduciary
duties, except where doing so would be “manifestly unreasonable”).
236. See, e.g., Manesh, Equity in LLC Law?, supra note 232, at 102–06 (describing the
contractual freedom afforded under LLC law); see also Manesh, Delaware and the Market
for LLC Law, supra note 62, at 225–34 (same); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners
Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 508–13 (2017) (same).
237. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (Supp. 2018).
238. See, e.g., id. § 18-1203(b).
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benefit and account for the interests of nonmember constituencies)
cannot be amended without the unanimous consent of the
members,239 making the entity’s commitment to pursue public benefit
even stronger than the commitment created by merely organizing as a
benefit LLC.240
Indeed, given the inherent flexibility of conventional LLC law,
every scholar and practitioner who has ever considered the issue has
concluded that benefit LLC legislation is unnecessary.241 In the words
of one leading scholar of social enterprises, “virtually all legal experts
agree that [conventional] LLC statutes are flexible enough to
accommodate social entrepreneurs.”242 Even B Lab acknowledges this
reality.243 In fact, B Lab has long offered model contract language that
can be incorporated into an LLC’s operating agreement,244 thus
providing a readymade, “off-the-rack” framework to translate benefit
corporation principles in the context of an LLC.245
In this respect, Delaware’s new benefit LLC legislation is
particularly extraordinary because it represents a fundamental
departure from the flexibility traditionally associated with the LLC
form.246 The provisions of the state’s benefit LLC statute purport to
be mandatory for benefit LLCs, inalterable and not subject to the
239. See id. § 18-302(e) (“If a limited liability company agreement provides for the
manner in which it may be amended . . . it may be amended only in that manner . . . .”); see
also REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110(a)(4) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (“[T]he operating agreement governs . . . the means and
conditions for amending the operating agreement.”).
240. See Molk, supra note 109, at 246–47.
241. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
242. Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 445.
243. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 65 (“For [LLCs], a more flexible form of
business entity, B Lab determined that binding commitments to stakeholders could be
made in the operating agreement, the primary constitutional document of an LLC.”); see
also Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 23 n.101 (reporting that the
primary drafter of the MBCL and B Lab’s outside counsel agrees that “LLC law is
generally flexible enough to accomplish social enterprise purposes”).
244. See B Lab, LLC Legal Roadmap, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://web.archive.org/
web/20180227082442/https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-ab-corp/legal-roadmap/llc-legal-roadmap [https://perma.cc/6RQX-8AUK].
245. One might argue that benefit LLC statutes provide a useful “off-the-rack”
solution for social enterprises that prefer the LLC form, “sav[ing] cash-strapped start-ups
the need to have legal counsel draft bespoke provisions.” See ALEXANDER, supra note 3,
at 155; accord Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 442 (articulating a
similar argument). But B Lab’s model language for LLC operating agreements
demonstrates that a readymade solution is already freely available, without the need for a
new statutory business form.
246. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 443 (noting the disconnect
between the mandatory rules of benefit LLC statutes and the “intentional flexibility of the
traditional LLC form”).
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freedom-of-contract principle that undergirds all other aspects of
LLCs.247 Undoubtedly, the mandatory nature of the benefit LLC
statute reflects a desire to ensure a degree of uniformity—in purpose,
governance, rights, and obligations—of all Delaware benefit LLCs.
But every single feature, right, or obligation mandated by Delaware’s
new benefit LLC statute could have already been achieved by a
conventional LLC through private ordering. From that perspective,
not only is the statutory benefit LLC totally unnecessary but it is also
in conflict with the contractual flexibility that has historically made
the LLC such a popular form of business.
III. THE POLICY CASE AGAINST STATUTORY BENEFIT ENTITIES
Without a plausible legal justification for its existence, the
benefit LLC plainly reveals what was arguably already apparent in
the context of its corporate predecessor: the aim of benefit entity
statutes is not law reform. The purpose of benefit entity legislation
has never really been to address some perceived shortcoming in the
existing legal frameworks governing conventional business entities.
Instead, the real aim of benefit entity statutes is to facilitate
branding.248 Benefit entity legislation is about creating a statesponsored brand for for-profit businesses to use to signal their virtue
to consumers, investors, and the broader public.249
Indeed, B Lab has not been coy about the importance of its
legislation to facilitate such branding.250 Alongside the facile legal
247. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1201 (Supp. 2018).
248. See Molk, supra note 109, at 248 (arguing that the principal motivation of
advocates for benefit corporation statutes “appears to be the marketing value that
organizing as a social enterprise-specific organizational form brings”); Murray, Choose
Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 44 (“One of the most talked about benefits that social
enterprise offers to its owners is branding.”); Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market,
supra note 9, at 559 (“One of the often-cited benefits of social enterprise legislation is the
branding or signaling aspect . . . .”).
249. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 447–48 (observing that
“[t]he main benefit of the benefit LLC form is the signaling provided by choosing the
form” and that for many entrepreneurs the signaling function is the most important
consideration in selecting an appropriate business form); Reiser, supra note 43, at 621
(“Social entrepreneurs wish to market their enterprises and their products to consumers,
partners, and employees as meaningfully different from either traditional nonprofits or
for-profits and view a hybrid form [like a benefit corporation or benefit LLC] as one route
to accomplish this goal.”).
250. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 154–55 (arguing that although benefit LLCs
“might not be necessary” given the inherent flexibility of conventional LLCs, a
conventional LLC “does not allow companies to differentiate themselves from the
competition with a recognizable entity form,” whereas a benefit LLC “provides a measure
of uniformity, so that investors, workers, customers, and other[s] . . . can recognize the
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argument made in support of benefit corporation legislation, B Lab
has emphasized the value of creating an easily recognizable signal for
socially minded consumers, workers, and investors.251 Benefit entity
statutes facilitate this signaling function by providing socially minded
businesses the statutory “benefit” moniker to distinguish themselves
from businesses organized as conventional corporations and LLCs,
which are presumably less virtuous or altruistic.252
The central importance of branding to B Lab is reflected in its
dogged insistence that all states considering benefit corporation
legislation adhere closely to B Lab’s model statute.253 Uniformity in
state statutes helps build and reinforce the brand—what it means to
be a statutory “benefit corporation.”254 Where a state charts its own
benefit ‘brand’”); CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 1 (emphasizing the “clear market
differentiation” offered by benefit corporations); Houlahan et al., supra note 3, at 300
(“We promoted [benefit corporations] because [we] want all stakeholders to be able to
distinguish good companies from good marketing.”).
251. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 2–6 (justifying benefit corporations based
upon the market demand for socially responsible businesses).
252. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 155 (“In a marketplace where ‘greenwashing’ is
common, a legal change of structure . . . to [a] benefit corporation can signal the
company’s commitment to its core values.”); Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note
21, at 516 (“Benefit corporations advertise themselves as different from ordinary, forprofit companies. They are better, more responsible, and kinder, and should therefore be
treated differently.”); Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra note 13, at 104
(“[B]eing a [benefit corporation] may generate enhanced credibility for a company’s
assertion that it is helping the world in a meaningful way.”); Molk, supra note 109, at 248
(“Organizing as a benefit [entity] sends a clear signal to the socially conscious public that
the organization prioritizes social good; organizing as [a conventional entity] sends no
signal . . . .”); Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 446 (noting that
organizing as a benefit entity “signals a commitment to ‘benefit’ society and the
environment” in contrast to a conventional entity “that provides no such signal—or maybe
even a signal that profit is paramount”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2,
at 44 (“Branding is . . . beneficial because it can help customers and investors quickly
identify socially and environmentally responsible companies.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 160
(“Benefit Corporation status can serve a signaling function that gives interested parties a
meaningful method of[] differentiation.”).
253. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 161–63 (describing the
aggressive opposition of B Lab and its affiliates to the efforts of the Colorado Bar
Association Business Law Section to propose legislation that deviated from the MBCL);
Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1034 (noting, based on
the author’s personal experiences with B Lab, that “unless proposed state benefit
corporation legislation substantially conforms to the [MBCL], [B Lab] will actively oppose
it and lobby for the Model Legislation”).
254. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 382 (explaining that
uniformity in benefit corporation statutes allows investors, consumers, and others to
assume certain core features irrespective of where the benefit corporation is organized);
see also Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1034 (“[T]he
branding effect [of benefit corporations] would be lost, or at least significantly diminished,
if more flexible benefit corporation statutes, varying widely from state to state, were to be
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path and creates a new socially minded statutory business form that
eschews the MBCL template, B Lab bitterly disowns the state’s
statute.255
The significance of branding is likewise reflected in the
mandatory nature of many of the statutory rules governing benefit
entities under both the B Lab and Delaware models.256 Rather than
supplying merely default rules of governance and allowing each
business to tailor those rules through private ordering, as is common
for conventional business entity statutes, both the B Lab and
Delaware benefit entity statutes impose several mandatory rules.
These unwaivable, inalterable rules—regarding, among other things,
a business’s public benefit purpose, the requirement that the
business’s managers consider the interests of all who may be affected
by the business’s activities, and requirements concerning benefit
reporting—ensure consistency among all businesses organized as a
benefit entity, again reinforcing the “benefit” brand.257
But if the sole, or even primary, justification for benefit entity
legislation is to create a state-endorsed designation and make that
designation available to private, for-profit businesses to signal their
altruism and virtue, then one should be sharply skeptical that such
legislation is an appropriate or worthwhile use of state power. As
detailed in Section A, existing benefit entity statutes offer no
accountability—no means to ensure that businesses that organize as a
benefit corporation or LLC are in any way deserving of the “benefit”
adopted.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 357 (“[T]ension often
exists between branding and private ordering. Maintenance of a useful brand associated
with a group of companies generally requires a fair level of consistency, often achieved
through mandatory rules.”).
255. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 163 (“[W]hat [B Lab] really
cares about is the name ‘benefit corporation’ . . . .”); Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation
Law, supra note 19, at 382 (“B Lab and its supporters have been insistent that jurisdictions
considering benefit corporation legislation adhere to the principles of the Model
Legislation or eschew the term benefit corporation, even though B Lab does not own any
rights to the term.”). Although B Lab has embraced Delaware’s benefit corporation
statute despite its deviations from the MBCL, B Lab has been critical of other alternatives
to the MBCL. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, app. C.
256. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101(d) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (“A provision of the articles of incorporation or bylaws of a benefit
corporation may not limit, be inconsistent with, or supersede a provision of [the
MBCL].”); accord DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1201 (Supp. 2018).
257. Cf. Welch & Saunders, supra note 158, at 865–66 (observing that mandatory rules
in Delaware’s conventional corporate law facilitate branding for Delaware corporations).
Of course, in addition to facilitating branding, advocates of benefit corporations might
argue that the mandatory statutory provisions are necessary to ensure a firm’s prosocial
commitment.
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moniker that is bestowed upon them with the state’s imprimatur.
Worse yet, as described in Section B, benefit entity legislation
imposes its own costs, creating needless complexity in the legal system
and fostering misimpressions about conventional for-profit
businesses. Moreover, as noted in Section C, state-sponsored
legislation is altogether unnecessary to enable socially minded
businesses to distinguish themselves; private certifications awarded by
nongovernmental organizations, like B Lab, already accomplish this
function. Given these considerations, the cost-benefit analysis easily
tips against statutory benefit entities—both benefit corporations and,
especially, LLCs.
A. State-Sponsored Branding Without Accountability
If the principal aim of benefit entity legislation is to create a
state-sanctioned designation for for-profit businesses that are
distinctly purpose driven and socially minded, then such legislation
should presumably provide some means of accountability.258
Specifically, the legislation should include some measures to ensure
that any business that is organized as a benefit corporation or LLC is
deserving of the “benefit” label. Otherwise, the state-sponsored label
risks misleading unsuspecting customers, investors, and the public
into believing that self-proclaimed “benefit” businesses are in fact
more virtuous or altruistic than businesses organized as conventional
corporations or LLCs.259
The problem is that existing benefit entity statutes offer no
accountability—no means for the public to ensure that a benefit
entity will pursue or produce public benefit any more or differently

258. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1016
(“Presumably, the benefit corporation should be accountable to the public and its
stakeholders if it is organized as a ‘benefit corporation.’”).
259. See Kennan El Khatib, Comment, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM.
U. L. REV. 151, 185 (2015) (“The creation of the benefit corporation has created a false
dichotomy between traditional corporations and benefit corporations . . . , foster[ing] the
illusion that benefit corporations are automatically more socially and environmentally
conscious than traditional corporations.”); see also Murray, The Social Enterprise Law
Market, supra note 9, at 560–61 (“‘[B]enefit corporation[]’ . . . connote[s] a focus on the
society at large. The public does not generally take the time to dive into the nuances of
corporate law, therefore, the name of the entity form may be important in the initial
shaping of the public’s view of the entity.”). But see Molk, supra note 109, at 254 (arguing
that, in light of the weaknesses in the statutory benefit corporation framework, “the signal
of being a ‘benefit corporation’ . . . as one pursuing social enterprise will not be
particularly credible”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 603 (2019)

650

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

than a business organized as a conventional corporation or LLC.260
Like conventional corporation and LLC law, benefit entity statutes
leave the owners of the business—corporate shareholders and LLC
members—in the same privileged position of being the sole
constituency empowered to (directly or indirectly) control the
business.261 And nothing in benefit entity statutes meaningfully
restricts those owners in deciding how and to what extent, if at all, to
pursue public good.262
Instead, as described below, benefit entity statutes are larded
with unenforceable, illusory commitments, a farcical enforcement
mechanism for those commitments, and an unserious, self-serving
disclosure mandate. Consequently, self-proclaimed benefit entities
are, as a practical matter, indistinguishable from conventional forprofit entities: they will only pursue public benefit if, and only to the
extent that, their owners choose to do so.263
1. Illusory Commitments
The legal commitments made by a business embracing the statesponsored designation of a benefit entity are astonishingly vague and
entirely illusory. As already explained, benefit entity statutes merely
require a business to, in the language of the MBCL, create a
“material positive impact on society and the environment”264 or, in
260. See J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change,
2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 110 (2012) [hereinafter Callison, Putting New Sheets on a
Procrustean Bed] (“[T]here is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that corporations
which fail to seek general public benefit do not latch on to the benefit corporation
moniker and the developing marketplace for social enterprises.”); Dorff, Assessing the
Assessment, supra note 21, at 516–17 (describing the statutory safeguards against misuse of
the benefit corporation as “toothless”); Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra
note 13, at 109 (observing, in the context of Delaware public benefit corporations, that
“the legal form does very little to prevent founders from adopting the appearance of a
prosocial organization while abandoning the substance”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 611
(“At the moment, benefit corporations require only formal articulation of a dual mission,
and oversight over the genuineness of these statements is lacking.”).
261. See Strine, Making It Easier for Directors, supra note 43, at 245 (“[The] ultimate
success [of the benefit corporation model] depend[s] on . . . investors who not only mouth
the belief that corporations should be managed for the best interests of all . . . but in fact
act on that belief [in] real world investing and voting decisions . . . .”).
262. See id. at 246 (“[B]ecause only stockholders are given rights under [benefit
corporation statutes] . . . [t]here is a legitimate concern that the [stockholders] will simply
abandon their principles and demand [a corporation’s board to maximize profits].”).
263. See supra notes 195–204 and accompanying text.
264. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55TSPDS] (defining “general public benefit”); see id. at § 201(a).
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the language of Delaware’s statutes, “produce a public benefit or
public benefits and to operate in a responsible and sustainable
manner.”265 Of course, one does not need a law degree to recognize
that these standards are so vague as to be meaningless and, therefore,
unenforceable.266 A business might plausibly assert that its production
of a good or service for which there exists public demand, its use of
carbon-saving LED bulbs rather than incandescent bulbs, or its
employment of workers who might otherwise be unemployed or
employed in less desirable positions are all a “public benefit.”267 Put
differently, any business could characterize its existing practices or
policies as creating a “material positive impact on society and the
environment.”268
265. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2016) (governing benefit corporations); id.
tit. 6, § 18-1202(a) (Supp. 2018) (governing benefit LLCs).
266. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 153 (“‘General public benefit’
is a mish-mash that lacks any . . . fiduciary duty limits and contains few restrictions to
hamper the freedom of self-interested directors . . . . The door is opened for directors who
act in self-interested fashion to point to some nebulous public benefit justification.”);
Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra note 13, at 109–10 (observing, in the
context of Delaware’s public benefit corporation statute, that the meaning of
“responsible,” “sustainable,” and “public benefit” is “extremely broad” and “less than
clear”); Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1025 (“[T]he
general public purpose does not delineate specific covenants or undertakings of the
benefit corporation that a third party could match up against the actions taken by the
corporation; rather, it sets forth a vague and general aspiration.”); Loewenstein, Benefit
Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 390 (“The general public benefit is, in essence, an
aspiration of the benefit corporation; having a positive effect on society and the
environment is unmeasurable and, therefore, not amenable to an opinion that the benefit
corporation ‘acted in accordance’ with that aspiration ‘in all material respects.’” (quoting
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302(c)(1) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55TSPDS])); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 30 (criticizing the mandatory
“general public benefit purpose” as “too vague because it does not provide a practical way
for directors to make decisions”); Yockey, supra note 111, at 794 (“The ability to justify
decisions by citing vague public benefit requirements or stakeholder interests could give
managers ‘broad cover’ . . . . [T]he wide range of interests that directors must consider
arguably makes them answerable to none.” (quoting Liam Pleven, When Doing Good
Meets Investing, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2013, 6:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324694904578598231690128560 [http://perma.cc/9GNW-9U98 (dark
archive)])).
267. To be sure, under the MBCL (but not under Delaware law), a business’s public
benefit must be assessed against a “third-party standard.” See § 102. But as explained
below, there are several reasons to be dubious about the accountability created by the
“third-party standard” requirements. See infra Section III.A.3.
268. § 102 (defining “general public benefit”); see Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware
Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247,
265 (2014) (observing that under Delaware’s statute “companies in the technology,
healthcare, and education sectors easily meet the minimal requirements of the public
benefit corporation form, because positive ‘educational,’ ‘medical,’ and ‘technological’
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The statutory mandate that the managers of a benefit entity
“consider” or “balance” the interests of constituencies beyond the
owners of the business is likewise precatory and, thus, unenforceable.
To merely “consider” such interests, as is required by the MBCL,269 is
a trivial burden270—one that it would be impossible to show that a
business’s managers failed to meet.271 Indeed, to “consider” various
stakeholder interests does not mean that the managers of a selfproclaimed benefit business will make decisions any differently than if
there were no such statutory mandate.272 After all, even a business
operating strictly on a profit-maximizing paradigm would need to
“consider” the impact of its actions on various nonowner
constituencies in order to operate most profitably.273
The obligation to “balance” such interests, as is required under
Delaware’s benefit entity statutes,274 is no different and, therefore,

effects are each considered a ‘public benefit’ by the Delaware statutory provisions
governing public benefit corporations”).
269. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS].
270. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1026
(observing that the statutory obligation to “consider” could be easily satisfied by “each
board decision on whatever matter [being] accompanied by a pro forma preamble reciting
that, in making a certain decision, the board considered the effect of that decision on the
listed constituencies”).
271. See Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 108–09
(criticizing the MBCL for freeing directors of accountability to any one constituency or
goal); see also Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1026–27
(same); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 28, 33–34 (same); Yockey,
supra note 111, at 794 (same).
272. See Clark & Babson, supra note 5, at 850 (conceding that the statutory mandate to
consider various constituencies “does not require a particular outcome of directors’
decision-making”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 599–600 (“The broad discretion benefit
corporation statutes accord to directors can . . . be faulted for giving directors unbridled
discretion . . . .”); Regina Robson, A New Look at Benefit Corporations: Game Theory and
Game Changer, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 501, 546 (2015) (“There is nothing in the MBCL that
prohibits [benefit corporation directors]––after giving due consideration to multiple
stakeholder interests––from choosing to give priority to shareholder interests.”).
273. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Opting
Out of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 415, 443
(2017) (“[I]t is incorrect to say that ‘regular corporations . . . cannot take into
consideration social factors’ because social factors impact the shareholder wealth analysis,
and not always negatively. In fact, in determining the best path to maximizing shareholder
value, corporations arguably must consider social factors in order to satisfy their duty of
care to become informed of all material information reasonably available.”).
274. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2016) (governing benefit corporations); id.
tit. 6, § 18-1202(a) (Supp. 2018) (governing benefit LLCs).
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subject to the same criticisms.275 To “balance” means that managers
must merely give some weight to the interests of stakeholders, not
that stakeholder interests should bear equal weight as the owners’
interests.276 “Balancing” can thus result in giving the interests of
stakeholders so little weight as to allow the owners’ interests to
predominate.277 Consequently, like the statutory obligation to
“consider,” the obligation to “balance” is an illusory commitment that
leaves an entity’s manager with essentially unfettered discretion.278
2. Farcical Enforcement
The sole legal vehicle aimed at ensuring that a self-proclaimed
benefit entity actually fulfills its otherwise illusory statutory
commitments is the benefit enforcement proceeding.279 But as an
accountability mechanism, the benefit enforcement proceeding is
farcical.
To begin with, standing to bring such a proceeding is limited to a
benefit entity’s owners.280 But the owners suffer from an obvious
conflict of interest: the owners stand to gain financially from the
business’s profits and, therefore, have a disincentive to bring a benefit
enforcement action that might potentially interfere with the
business’s profit making.281 In contrast to the entity’s owners,
275. See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 355 n.64 (reporting that
one drafter of Delaware’s benefit corporation statute viewed the difference between
“balance” and “consider” as minor and unimportant).
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 92 (“Though the statute mandates . . . balancing
. . . it does not mandate any particular outcome . . . .”).
279. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2016) (governing Delaware benefit
corporations); id. tit. 6, § 18-1206 (Supp. 2018) (governing Delaware benefit LLCs);
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305(a) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS].
280. See tit. 8, § 367 (governing Delaware benefit corporations); id. tit. 6, § 18-1206
(Supp. 2018) (governing Delaware benefit LLCs); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.
§ 305(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20
legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS]. The MBCL also authorizes
the corporation to bring such a proceeding, but it is implausible that directors would
authorize a corporation to do so. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note
19, at 387.
281. See Reiser, supra note 43, at 613 (“If a benefit corporation begins veering away
from its dual mission to achieve greater profits, shareholders stand to gain financially from
this decision.”); see also Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 45
(“While the shareholders might be adequate guardians of their own interests, it does not
seem likely that shareholders will do an adequate job defending the interests of the
general public.”); Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 9, at 550
(“Shareholders may not have significant incentives to keep directors accountable to other
stakeholders, especially when doing so reduces the shareholders’ financial returns.”).
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nonowners—those who might benefit from the business’s purported
public benefit purpose and otherwise do not suffer from the same
financial conflict of interest—are expressly denied standing to bring a
benefit enforcement proceeding.282 Likewise, no governmental
regulator has standing to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding,
despite the “benefit” designation that is generously granted with the
state’s imprimatur.283
Setting aside the stark conflict of interest problem, there are
other reasons to be skeptical about the benefit enforcement
proceeding as a viable accountability mechanism. To name one,
virtually all benefit entities are closely held businesses284 in which
there is typically substantial, if not complete, overlap between the
business’s owners and the individuals who serve as its managers. In
that context, it is absurd to expect the owners to sue themselves in
their managerial capacity to enforce the business’s statutory
commitment to create public benefit.285
Even when owners do not themselves serve as managers of a
benefit entity, as already noted, the owners—and not any other
nonowner constituency—have the sole right to appoint the entity’s
managers, whether it is through the election of corporate directors by
shareholder vote or the appointment of an LLC’s managers pursuant

282. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 388 (“[T]he persons
with the greatest incentive to sue the benefit corporation—the beneficiaries of its specific
public benefit—are expressly denied standing [to bring a benefit enforcement
proceeding].”); see also Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at
1021 (“Perhaps the best judges of the effectiveness of [a benefit] corporation’s efforts are
the supposed beneficiaries of its benefit purposes [but those beneficiaries] are denied
standing under the [MBCL].”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 362
(“The fact that other stakeholders cannot bring a claim creates some doubt that the
benefit enforcement proceedings alone will give third parties confidence in the social value
created by benefit corporations.”).
283. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1021–22;
Reiser, supra note 43, at 613 (observing that, in contrast to nonprofits, “[t]here is no
regulatory role for any public official in the benefit corporation”).
284. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 386 (observing that
“almost all benefit corporations [are] privately held businesses”); Winston, supra note 39,
at 1829 (“[M]ost benefit corporations are currently small companies that are privately
owned . . . .”).
285. See Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra note 13, at 104–05 (“Only
shareholders have standing to sue to enforce the [directors’ statutory duties], and in
closely held [benefit corporations], the shareholders are likely to be the same people as
the directors. Barring a rift among the shareholders, then, there seems little chance of a
lawsuit.”); Winston, supra note 39, at 1829 (“In a small, privately owned benefit
corporation [where] there is substantial overlap among the officers, directors, and
shareholders[,] . . . the shareholders cannot be effective enforcers of mission because they
are the same people as the management they are supposed to be monitoring.”).
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to the terms of an LLC agreement. Naturally, where owners get to
select the managers, the managers will do the owners’ bidding—which
may or may not involve creating public benefit.286 In that context, it is
again absurd to expect the owners to bring a benefit enforcement
proceeding against the managers they have selected (and have the
power to remove) in order to enforce the business’s statutory
commitments.287
Even where there is a dissenting owner, as might be the case in a
publicly traded benefit entity, it is doubtful that the owner would ever
succeed in a benefit enforcement proceeding. First, a benefit
enforcement proceeding brought against the entity’s managers is
considered a derivative, rather than direct, lawsuit.288 As such, the
lawsuit will be subject to various procedural barriers associated with
all derivative actions, including the obligation to first make a demand
on the entity’s managers or otherwise demonstrate the futility of such
a demand.289
Second, assuming the dissenting owner’s claims can survive these
procedural barriers, as already noted, the statutory standards of what
qualifies as a “public benefit” and the conduct required of managers
are so vague as to be meaningless and, therefore, not susceptible to
judicial enforcement.290 Rather than second-guess the judgment of an
entity’s managers as to how to create public benefit, courts are likely
to defer to the managers’ judgment,291 applying the business judgment
286. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 153 (“[S]hareholders hire and
fire directors, and it is likely that when private shareholder benefit and broader public
benefit collide, many directors will ‘follow the money’ and align with shareholder
interests.”); Strine, Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I, supra note 197, at 179
(“[W]hen a conflict emerges between the interests of corporate constituencies without
power within the corporate polity—which is all of them other than stockholders—and the
one with power—the stockholders—those elected by the stockholders bend to the will of
their citizenry [i.e., the stockholders].”).
287. See Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 517 (“In closely held
companies, none [of those who have standing to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding]
are likely to have an incentive to enforce the company’s social mission with a lawsuit,
barring unusual circumstances.”).
288. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2016) (governing Delaware benefit
corporations); id. tit. 6, § 18-1206 (Supp. 2018) (governing Delaware benefit LLCs);
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305(c)(2) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55TSPDS].
289. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 387–88.
290. See supra Section III.A.1.
291. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 3, at 28 (“If the corporation could show a
meaningful good faith effort to pursue such positive impacts, then a judge would likely be
reticent to interpose his or her judgment for the corporation’s.”); Murray, Social
Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 365–66 (“Without clarity on priority or weight of
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rule or a “purpose judgment rule” variant,292 in the absence of
evidence suggesting a conflict of interest or subjective bad faith.293
Finally, even if the dissenting owner can convince a court that the
entity’s managers failed to meet their ill-defined statutory
commitments, the best a prevailing owner can hope for is some form
of nonmonetary remedy, because money damages are statutorily
prohibited.294
Given these many limitations, it is improbable that a dissenting
owner would ever elect to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding.295
Indeed, after nearly a decade since the first benefit corporation
statute, there are no reported cases involving a benefit enforcement

the factors that [benefit corporation] directors must balance, significant accountability
imposed by the courts becomes highly unlikely.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 612 (“[Benefit
corporation statutes] impose no clear framework for directorial decision making. Without
one, it is difficult to identify a metric by which shareholders might enforce fiduciaries’
compliance with dual mission.”); Yockey, supra note 111, at 797 (“Even if shareholders
litigate issues bearing on a benefit corporation’s social pursuits, courts confronting this
new and unique space will likely resist substituting their judgment for that of management
so long as managers appear to be making a good faith effort.”).
292. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 41–42.
293. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (2016) (providing that a director’s statutory
obligation to “balance” the interests of owners with those of nonowners “will be deemed
. . . satisf[ied] . . . if [her] decision is both informed and disinterested and not such that no
person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve”); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.
§ 301(e) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20
legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] (providing that a director’s
statutory obligation to “consider” the interests of various constituencies is fulfilled if the
director is disinterested, informed, and “rationally believes that the business judgment is in
the best interests of the benefit corporation”).
294. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1204(a) (Supp. 2018) (governing Delaware
benefit LLCs); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 301(c), 305(b) (2017),
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_
4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS] Delaware’s benefit corporation statute
contemplates money damages but allows a corporation’s charter to exculpate those
damages. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(c) (2016). In practice, such exculpation clauses are
standard. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians,
Waiver of Liability Provision, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 285 (2009)
(finding that all but one corporation in the Fortune 100 have exculpation provisions); J.
Travis Laster, Revlon Is A Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 52 (2013) (describing “corporations without exculpatory
provisions in their charters” as “rare”).
295. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 388 (concluding, in
light of the many limitations to a benefit enforcement proceeding, “there is little incentive
to bring such a claim”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 362 (“With
monetary damages unavailable, plaintiffs and their attorneys have less incentive to bring
benefit enforcement proceedings [and] directors have less reason to fear the proceedings
. . . .”).
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proceeding.296 And there is no reason to believe such proceedings will
be brought any more frequently in the analogous context of benefit
LLCs. All of this has led one typically measured business law scholar
to conclude the benefit enforcement proceeding is “an ephemeral
remedy [and] at best[] an illusion”297—one that masks the true
unenforceability of the statutory commitments made by businesses
embracing the state-sponsored “benefit” designation.
3. Feckless Reporting Mandate
The statutorily mandated benefit report does little to address the
lack of accountability. In theory, the benefit report provides
transparency and, thus, a measure of accountability by allowing the
public to decide for itself whether a self-proclaimed benefit entity is
living up to its public benefit commitment.298 In practice, however,
benefit reports merely provide businesses with an opportunity to
engage in self-congratulatory propagandizing.299
Although a business’s benefit report must provide a narrative
description of the ways the business pursued and created public
benefit and any hindrances the business faced in doing so,300 this
overly vague statutory mandate gives a benefit entity “an extreme
amount of freedom in deciding what to report” and what to omit.301
Moreover, a benefit report is not required to be audited or certified
by a third party,302 and there is no express penalty against a benefit

296. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 388; Murray, Social
Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 366 n.117.
297. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 388–89; accord Yockey,
supra note 111, at 797 (concluding that “the benefit enforcement proceeding is fairly
toothless”).
298. Of course, even this theory is highly dubious because it relies on the “fanciful”
assumption that consumers will take the time to retrieve, review, and then intelligently
assess such reports. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 386–87.
299. See Ball, supra note 4, at 968 (“[T]he benefit report is characterized as a
marketing and branding tool for social enterprises not a corporate governance
mechanism.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 360 (“Many of the
few annual [benefit] reports that are currently available are self-promotional and do not
provide much value to a reader looking for a full, fair evaluation of the business.”).
300. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a)(1) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS].
301. Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 46; accord Murray,
Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 359–60.
302. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS].
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entity for false or misleading reporting.303 Under this feckless
framework, because a benefit entity, its managers, and owners all
have a financial and reputational interest in portraying the business
most positively, benefit reports are destined to be nothing more than
self-promoting puffery.304
To temper the potential for such abuse, the MBCL also requires
a business embracing the “benefit” brand to include in its benefit
report an assessment of its overall social and environmental
performance against a “third-party standard.”305 As already noted, B
Lab’s proprietary B Impact Assessment qualifies as a “third-party
standard,” but that only raises questions about B Lab’s apparent selfinterest in promoting benefit entity legislation.306 To the extent
benefit entity legislation channels socially minded businesses to
measure themselves against B Lab’s standards, such legislation only

303. See Ball, supra note 4, at 963; Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at
539–40; Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 359. State fraud laws may
provide a safeguard against false or misleading assessments, but a plaintiff claiming fraud
would need to show scienter and harm caused by the fraud. See Dorff, Assessing the
Assessment, supra note 21, at 539–40.
304. See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 359 (noting that the
“vague” statutory requirements for a benefit report under the MBCL “allow[] for
significant puffery”); see also Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra
note 260, at 111 (concluding the MBCL permits a business to produce a benefit report that
is “sketchy, forward-looking, vague, non-analytical or fabricated, and no one will know the
difference”); Yockey, supra note 111, at 796 (noting that the MBCL enables “firms with
negative or hard-to-express information [to] simply withhold disclosure or release only
partial information”).
305. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a)(2) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS].
306. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, supra note 19, at 386 (“[I]nasmuch B
Lab meets the statutory requirement of providing a third-party standard, [it] smacks of
self-interest.”); id. at 391 n.42 (observing, based on the author’s personal experience, that
B Lab opposes benefit corporation legislation that does not require an annual assessment
based on a third-party standard); see also Heminway, What Am I Missing, supra note 193
(“B Lab, which supports or is behind the benefit corporation legislative proposals . . . is
essentially the only [third-party standard] that meets the statutory standards. This smells
of conflicting interests . . . .”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 352
n.41 (“B Lab serves as both a driving force behind the lobbying efforts and a provider of
the dominant third-party standard. This dual role seems to suggest a conflict of interest
. . . .”); Yockey, supra note 111, at 798 (“A cynic might note that B Lab [who lobbied for
the Model Act] also happens to be in a position to gain reputational benefits by providing
firms with the assessment standards that the Model Act requires.”). As already noted,
although B Lab provides benefit corporations complimentary access to B Lab’s B Impact
Assessment tool, B Lab offers businesses that earn a qualifying score on its proprietary
assessment the opportunity to be certified as a “B Corporation” for a fee. See supra note
49 and accompanying text.

97 N.C. L. REV. 603 (2019)

2019]

BENEFIT LLCs

659

empowers and aggrandizes the reach of one private nonprofit to
impose onto others its idiosyncratic vision of public good.307
To be sure, as an alternative to B Lab’s standards, a benefit
entity is free to select another set of third-party standards, so long as
those standards meet the statutory definition set forth in the MBCL.
But the MBCL defines “third-party standard” in only general
terms,308 leaving private standard-setters largely unregulated and free
to prescribe their own conception of what constitutes public benefit.309
The only statutory restrictions are that the standard-setter is
independent of the benefit entity and that its standards are
comprehensive, transparent, and credible.310 As observed by one
scholar, “[i]f a standard-setter clearly and transparently sets low
standards, it may qualify [as a ‘third-party standard’ under the
MBCL] . . . just as a standard setter with higher standards, leaving the
door open to greenwashing or even fraud.”311
Of course, benefit entities may have little need to shop for a
particularly lenient third-party standard, because the MBCL does not
statutorily require a business to obtain any particular level of
achievement against those standards in order to retain its statebestowed “benefit” status.312 Whatever third-party standard a benefit
entity chooses, the business and its managers, and not the third-party
standard-setter, get to assess the business’s performance against those

307. See Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, supra note 13, at 111 (observing that
one disadvantage of B Lab’s dominance as a third-party standard-setter is “that by
imposing a particular vision of how companies should behave, it impedes entrepreneurs
from experimenting with a variety of different approaches”); see also Callison, Putting
New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 98 (criticizing this aspect of the
[MBCL] as “illiberal and conformity-inducing”).
308. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
-SPDS] (defining “third-party standard”).
309. See Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 46 (“There is
. . . little to no oversight or assurance of quality with regards to the third-party
standards.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 611 (observing that standard-setters are left
“unregulated . . . bounded by neither standards nor oversight”).
310. See § 102 (defining “third-party standard”).
311. Reiser, supra note 43, at 611; see also id. at 617 (“[T]he delegation to third-party
standard-setters to vet . . . public benefit and the lack of a statutory floor for what counts
as public benefit make low standards and greenwashing particular concerns for the benefit
corporation.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 361–62 (“A benefit
corporation that does not see the value in using a third-party standard may choose to use
the weakest standard available, provide little to no useful information to the market, and
waste company resources in the process. Under the [MBCL], this sort of activity by
opportunistic benefit corporations would be difficult to punish . . . .”).
312. See Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 551.
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standards.313 The third-party standard-setter has no say in that
assessment, the business need not provide any supporting
documentation,314 and, as already noted, there is no express penalty
for false or misleading reporting.315
Add to these concerns the fact that under the MBCL there is no
apparent enforcement mechanism to ensure a “benefit” business even
prepares and publishes the statutorily required benefit report.316
Although the MBCL requires a benefit entity to file its benefit report
with the state in which it is organized,317 the legislation provides for no
consequences if a business fails to do so.318 Perhaps the owners of a
benefit entity can bring a benefit enforcement proceeding to compel
the noncomplying business to perform its reporting obligation,319 but,
as already noted, there are numerous reasons to be skeptical that the
owners would ever elect to do so.320 What is clear is that neither
members of the public nor any governmental authority—those who
otherwise have no way to confirm a self-proclaimed benefit entity is
deserving of its state-sanctioned “benefit” label—have standing to
compel a business to actually prepare and publish a benefit report.321
Given the fecklessness of the MBCL legal framework, it is
unsurprising that an empirical study showed compliance with the
statutory benefit reporting mandate is “abysmal,” at less than ten

313. See id. at 551–52.
314. See id.
315. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
316. See Ball, supra note 4, at 963; Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4,
at 359.
317. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402(d) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS]. Although the MBCL requires a benefit corporation’s annual benefit report
to be filed with the state, most of the states that have adopted the MBCL have omitted
this particular provision in their state statutes. See Murray, An Early Report on Benefit
Reports, supra note 39, at 31–32, 47.
318. The MBCL includes no express penalty for a benefit corporation’s failure to file
its annual benefit report with the state, and most state benefit corporation statutes have
followed MBCL in this regard. See § 402(d).
319. The MBCL does not expressly provide that a benefit enforcement proceeding
may be brought to compel the production of a benefit report. See id. § 305(a). But
presumably a shareholder may bring such a proceeding by alleging that the failure to
produce a benefit report is a “violation of [a statutory] obligation,” which is an
appropriate ground for such a proceeding. See id.; Murray, An Early Report on Benefit
Reports, supra note 39, at 44.
320. See supra Section III.A.2.
321. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305(c) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/
default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W55T-SPDS] (identifying the parties who have standing to bring a benefit enforcement
proceeding).
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percent in the sample surveyed.322 Of the very few businesses that did
produce a benefit report, the study showed that the contents of a
majority of reports failed to comply with the statutory requirements
of the MBCL.323 To take a particularly risible example from the study,
the benefit report of one company identified, without elaboration, an
otherwise obscure individual, “John Franco,” as its third-party
standard.324 Who is John Franco? What are his standards? And do
those standards meet the letter or spirit of the MBCL? It is
impossible to tell because, under the MBCL, neither the public nor
any governmental authority has the means to answer any of these
questions.325 In all, the study’s findings seem to only confirm that the
nominally required benefit report is, in fact, optional and offers no
accountability.326
Perhaps in recognition of the many flaws in the MBCL,
Delaware’s benefit entity statutes abandon much of the pretense
surrounding benefit reports. Under Delaware statutes, the benefit
report need not include an assessment against a third-party standard
and need not be made publicly available to constituencies other than
the business’s owners.327 In effect, Delaware’s statutes seem to
concede that self-proclaimed benefit entities are, like conventional
corporations and LLCs, accountable only to their owners and no one
else.
B.

Costs of Benefit Entity Statutes

By creating a state-sanctioned “benefit” designation and making
it available to private, for-profit enterprises without accountability,
benefit entity statutes invite misuse and exploitation.328 Absentminded entrepreneurs may, with the best of intentions, embrace the
“benefit” mantle but abjectly fail to comply with the statute’s letter or
spirit. Worse yet, outright charlatans may cynically flaunt the state322. See Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, supra note 39, at 26.
323. See id. at 56–57 (depicting in tabular format the statutorily required elements
missing from the benefit reports surveyed).
324. See id. at 46.
325. See id. at 47 n.116.
326. See id. at 44 (identifying the “[l]ack of effective statutory enforcement
mechanisms” as one explanation for “widespread benefit report noncompliance”).
327. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(a) (2016) (governing benefit corporations); id.
tit. 6, § 18-1205 (Supp. 2018) (governing benefit LLCs).
328. See Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 109
(“To the extent a ‘benefit corporation’ election is intended to confer special branding
status in the marketplace, the unregulated nature of the election, and the possibility of
greenwashing for-profit activities under the benefit corporation label, is a significant
problem.”).
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endorsed “benefit” designation to lure gullible, uninformed
customers, investors, or employees. In either case, because benefit
entity statutes offer no accountability to the public, there will be no
consequences for well-meaning entrepreneurs or mendacious
hucksters using the “benefit” moniker to gain an unfair advantage
over businesses organized as conventional corporations and LLCs.329
This risk of misuse and exploitation should be enough to counsel
against benefit entity statutes—especially when conventional
corporate and LLC statutes already enable social enterprises to
pursue a social mission alongside profits. But even if this risk does not
materialize—even if statutory benefit corporations and LLCs do
largely live up to their “benefit” aspiration—benefit entity statutes
impose their own costs, adding needless complexity to an already
complex legal system and exacerbating misimpressions about
conventional for-profit businesses.
1. Needless Complexity
Business law is already awash in a bewildering array of statutory
business forms. There are corporations, LLCs, and partnerships of all
types, including general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited
liability partnerships, and limited liability limited partnerships.330
Within some forms, there are subforms. For example, LLCs may be
member managed or manager managed, and corporations may, for
tax purposes, elect between S-corporations versus C-corporations.
Some states have also authorized other types of statutory business
forms to accommodate social enterprises in addition to or in lieu of
benefit corporations and LLCs.331 Thus, even before the advent of
benefit corporations and LLCs, it was easy for anyone without
specialized legal training to be overwhelmed by the number of
choices and distinctions between each.
Enacting benefit corporation and, now, benefit LLC legislation
creates even more statutory business entities to reckon with. The

329. Cf. Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 44 (observing that “[t]he
benefits of a social enterprise brand have potential to be significant”).
330. In addition to these familiar entities, there are others, like nonprofit corporations
and statutory trusts. See generally Brewer, supra note 228, at 691–708 (discussing nonprofit
corporations as social enterprises); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust As “Uncorporation”: A
Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31 (discussing statutory business trusts generally).
331. See Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, supra note 9, at 543–55
(identifying various types of newly enacted statutory business associations catering to
social enterprises).
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costs of this added complexity will be borne by many.332 Law students,
for example, will be forced to spend time understanding these new
business forms. In a standard three- or four-credit law school course
on business associations, only so much time may be devoted to each
type of statutory business entity. Covering benefit corporations and
LLCs will necessarily come at the expense of existing statutory forms,
which already enable what benefit entity legislation purports to. Less
versed in conventional corporations and LLCs, graduating law
students will be less prepared for legal practice.
Already out of law school, legal practitioners will likewise need
to devote unbillable time educating themselves to understand these
new statutory business entities in order to competently advise their
clients, as is their professional responsibility.333 Their clients, too, will
suffer from the added complexity. Entrepreneurs launching a new
business already face a dizzying set of options, and the benefit
corporation and LLC only further complicate the process of selecting
an appropriate statutory entity.334
Like new businesses, the owners of existing businesses will also
be forced to reassess their current legal structure and consider
whether it makes sense to reorganize as a benefit entity.335 The need
to reassess will become particularly acute if competitors embrace the
state-sponsored “benefit” mantle and, thereby, gain an edge in the
market for customers, investment dollars, and employees. In such
cases, owners of existing businesses may feel compelled to reorganize
as a benefit entity, not to pursue social good per se but instead to
simply rebalance the competitive playing field made uneven by
benefit entity legislation.
For both new businesses and established ventures alike, the task
of understanding these new statutory business forms, and their
differences from other, more established forms of statutory business
associations, will likely require the aid of legal counsel, which is
typically expensive. Thus, for all businesses—whether or not they
avail themselves of benefit entity legislation—grappling with these
new statutory business forms will increase costs, while achieving
nothing in terms of legal capability.

332. See Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge, supra note 19, at 1035 (“The
proliferation of business organizations is confusing to the public and the bar.”).
333. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
334. See Tu, supra note 21, at 172.
335. See id.
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2. Fostering Misperceptions
Unfortunately, the task of understanding benefit entities—and
their purpose and function within the broader landscape of statutory
business associations—is made no simpler by the convoluted rationale
given for their existence. On one hand, B Lab and other advocates
have asserted that the new statutory business form offers an antidote
to conventional corporate law’s restrictive mandate of shareholder
primacy. And it is easy to have this impression of conventional
corporate law reading the excerpts from Dodge, Revlon, and eBay out
of context.336
It is harder to understand these precedents in the larger legal
framework that governs corporations and other statutory business
associations. It takes prolix law review articles, like this one, to
explain that conventional corporate and LLC law does not inexorably
compel a business or its managers to mercilessly pursue profits at the
expense of other considerations. As this Article has demonstrated,
nothing in conventional corporate or, especially, LLC law precludes a
social entrepreneur from forming and operating a business that is
committed to balancing profits against a public mission. Indeed, as
already noted, there are several examples of prominent businesses
organized as conventional corporations or LLCs that do so
successfully.337
But when legislatures enact statutes that explicitly authorize
certain businesses to advance public benefit, it naturally leads to the
negative inference that existing law somehow prohibits conventional
corporations and LLCs from doing the same.338 Benefit entity statutes
336. Cf. Khatib, supra note 259, at 174 (“The theory that the benefit corporation
emerged as a result of legal necessity is misleading. . . . [A]dvocates of the benefit
corporation have preyed on the fears of social entrepreneurs to help solidify the new
corporate form.”).
337. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 153 (warning that the
existence of statutory benefit corporations implicitly suggests “all other corporations that
do not elect benefit corporation status and impliedly must act only in ways that relate to
shareholder profit maximization”); Callison, Putting New Sheets on A Procrustean Bed,
supra note 260, at 104–05 (warning that statutory benefit corporations create a “legislative
inference that corporations that are not benefit corporations can act only in ways that
maximize shareholder profit”); Joshua P. Fershee, supra note 138, at 362–63 (“Now that
many states have alternative social enterprise entity structures, there is an increased risk
that traditional entities will be viewed (by both courts and directors) as pure profit
vehicles, eliminating directors’ ability to make choices with the public benefit in mind
. . . .”); Manesh, Nearing 30, supra note 198, at 144 (“The very existence of an alternative
legal regime rejecting the primacy of shareholders may serve as a counterpoint for
corporate law, ossifying the already pervasive norm within traditional, for-profit
corporations that boards must mercilessly pursue shareholder wealth maximization under
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thus perpetuate the misperception that conventional corporations and
LLCs are legally compelled to seek profits solely for the benefit of
their owners339—that such businesses cannot, do not, or should not
seek to benefit the public.340
Fomenting this misperception will have pernicious consequences.
The managers and owners of businesses organized as conventional
corporations or LLCs (not to mention the lawyers who advise them),
may interpret the advent of statutory benefit entities to mean that
conventional businesses are somehow legally precluded from
pursuing initiatives that might advance social welfare at the expense
of profits.341 Worse yet, to the extent law shapes normative

all circumstances.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 174 (“[T]he existence of Benefit Corporation
statutes may have the unintended consequence of being construed as a legislative mandate
that, under corporate law, considering broader stakeholder interest and creating a public
benefit is wholly prohibited unless a business has opted to organize or reincorporate as a
Benefit Corporation.”).
339. See, e.g., Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 88
(“Even if the legal effect of the shareholder profit-maximization norm might be
overstated, the widely-held perception that corporations exist to maximize shareholder
profit can operate on a prophylactic level to discourage directors from considering nonshareholder interests when making significant corporate decisions.”); Fershee, supra note
138, at 363 (“There is an increasing sense, with the general public and in the courts, that
anything else a [conventional] business does must be secondary to, and must not at all
interfere with, profit seeking.”); Reiser, supra note 43, at 609 (“Whatever the correct
answer is on the state of the law, fiduciaries rightly or wrongly are often wedded to the
idea that in a for-profit entity their foremost goal should be maximizing the entity’s value
to its owners.”).
340. The MBCL attempts to mitigate this misperception by stipulating that the statute
“shall not of itself create an implication that a contrary or different rule of law is
applicable to a business corporation that is not a benefit corporation.” See MODEL
BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101(b) (2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55T-SPDS].
But this provision “does not change the existential question of whether a legislature’s
adoption of a benefit corporation statute entails recognition of the profit maximization
norm as a starting place for all corporations.” Callison, Putting New Sheets on a
Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 105 n.83.
341. See, e.g., Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 659 (“The development of
entities like the benefit corporation creates the perception in the minds of entrepreneurs
that they cannot carry out a social mission through a traditional business corporation.”);
Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 105 (warning that
benefit corporation statutes “perpetuate[] the misconception that current corporate law
requires directors to focus solely on immediate profit and share price maximization”); Tu,
supra note 21, at 173 (“Even though [conventional] corporate law is flexible enough to
accommodate the pursuit of both profit and public benefit, the public, corporate managers
[and] shareholders . . . may construe Benefit Corporations as the only proper (or at least
lowest risk) legal entity for pursuing a hybrid corporate purpose.”).
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opinions,342 owners and managers of conventional businesses may
come to believe that they in fact have no social responsibility, that the
sole purpose of their business is to maximize profits, and that the
promotion of social welfare is instead the province of benefit
businesses, philanthropies, or the public sector.343
Customers, investors, and society more broadly may become
similarly deluded. Believing that conventional businesses are legally
compelled to maximize profits, society will expect less of conventional
businesses and excuse their socially or environmentally irresponsible
misdeeds.344

342. See Robson, supra note 272, at 503 (“Law can cause the behavior of market
participants to coalesce around a particular strategy and provide affirmation that other
participants are acting in a similar manner.”).
343. See, e.g., Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, What Is A “Social” Business and Why
Does the Answer Matter?, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 278, 312 (2014) (“The
creation of [benefit corporations] tacitly gives credence to the widely held but inaccurate
view that standard, for-profit corporations can legally justify misconduct or unethical
decision-making as the relentless pursuit of profits required by corporate law.”); Lyman
Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U.
L. REV. 269, 295 (2013) (“[T]o the extent Benefit Corps. represent a segmenting of the
market, some traditional firms might be glad to abandon at least some of their social
responsibility initiatives . . . on the rationale that now those ‘are for Benefit Corps. to
do.’”); Robson, supra note 272, at 552–53 (“[T]he creation of a specialized entity, with a
statutorily defined purpose of creating a general public benefit . . . undermines the notion
. . . that the obligation to consider the interests of stakeholders should be an integral part
of all business entities.” (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted)); Tu, supra note 21, at 177
(“[T]he existence of Benefit Corporations statutes could also be used to justify the lack of
social initiatives by traditional for-profit corporations. . . . For-profit corporations facing
pressure for their lack of social initiatives could point to Benefit Corporation statutes as a
justification for their laser focus on profit maximization . . . .”).
344. As others have observed,
[The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation] . . . create[s] the perception in the
minds of consumers, investors, and society as a whole that they should not expect
much from typical corporations or should excuse their poor behavior as legally
required under the shareholder wealth maximization norm—when it is in fact
not—and that only these specially designated entities can or should be expected to
pursue any social goals.
See Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 659; see also Callison, Putting New Sheets on a
Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 105 (“[T]he benefit corporation movement arguably
harms the broader interests of 21st century corporate governance by creating a bipolar
world of regular corporations that maximize private profits and other corporations that
consider social and environmental sustainability and other public goods.”); Jessica Chu,
Note, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth
Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 186–87 (2012) (“[B]enefit corporations
further reinforce the assumption that corporations exist only to make money for their
shareholders. . . . Their creation establishes a legal dichotomy that only strengthens the
shareholder primacy norm and furthers the unwarranted belief that ‘regular’ corporations
are unable to do social good.”).
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Finally, courts, too, might arrive at the same conclusions.345
Historically, courts have wisely avoided second-guessing decisions
made by business managers to advance social welfare at the expense
of profits.346 Applying the business judgment rule, courts have instead
deferred to the managers of a given company on the complex
question of what is in the best interest of that company.347 But the
advent of benefit entities might naturally lead courts to make the
negative inference that conventional corporations and LLCs may not
sacrifice profits for public benefit.348 Judicial movement in this
direction would erode the protection of the business judgment rule349
and create a strong disincentive for business managers to undertake
prosocial initiatives, lest they be subsequently enjoined or, worse yet,
face personal liability in a shareholder lawsuit alleging breach of
fiduciary duty.350
Whatever the case—whether it is owners, managers, judges, or
society more broadly that conclude that conventional corporations
and LLCs may not pursue public benefit at the expense of profits—
the result will be the same: businesses organized as conventional
345. See Fershee, supra note 138, at 384 (“With the addition of social benefit entities,
courts are even more likely to question the business purpose of traditional entities.”);
Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy, supra note 166, at 483 (“It is quite possible
that Chancery would now say that the implied public policy of [Delaware corporate law] is
that deviation from shareholder primacy has to be done in the way prescribed by the
[benefit corporation provisions], or not at all.”).
346. See supra notes 129–38 and accompanying text.
347. As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court,
[A] core rationale of the business judgment rule . . . is that judges are poorly
positioned to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility to
having them second-guess the determination of impartial decision-makers with
more information (in the case of directors) or an actual economic stake in the
outcome (in the case of informed, disinterested stockholders).
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313–14 (Del. 2015); see also Bernard S.
Sharfman, The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 27, 46
(2017) (rationalizing the business judgment rule on the basis that “[j]udges need to respect
Board decision-making for the simple reason that they are inferior to the Board in terms
of determining what is the best corporate decision”).
348. See Fershee, supra note 138, at 386.
349. See id. at 384–87.
350. See Callison, Benefit Corporations, supra note 52, at 153 (“For non-electing
corporations, the existence of the benefit corporation alternative may weaken the
promotion of socially responsible decision-making by corporate boards, the directors of
which do not want to be brought into litigation or test the protections of the business
judgment rule.”); Tu, supra note 21, at 174–77 (warning that “[m]anagers of a traditional
for-profit corporation might decide to reduce or eliminate broader social endeavors to
mitigate the risk of an increasingly unpredictable legal environment [created by benefit
corporation statutes]”).
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corporations or LLCs will retreat from socially minded programs and
initiatives, and society will suffer a net decrease in public benefit
arising from private enterprises.351 This is an ironic result for a
legislative movement that is ostensibly intended to harness the power
of for-profit businesses to advance social welfare.
C.

Availability of Private Branding

Given the risk that benefit entity statutes may be readily
exploited to mislead the public and compete unfairly with
conventional corporations and LLCs, and the attendant costs such
statutes create by adding needless complexity and stoking
misperceptions about conventional corporations and LLCs, it is hard
to justify the enactment of such statutes—especially where, as has
been demonstrated, from a legal perspective such statutes accomplish
nothing.
But the case against benefit entity statutes is even stronger. If the
purpose of benefit entity legislation is to facilitate an easily
recognizable brand for socially minded businesses to distinguish
themselves in the market, then there already exists an obvious
alternative to state-enacted legislation. Private certifications, like B
Lab’s very own B Corporation certification, achieve the same
signaling function and do so more effectively than benefit entity
statutes.352 In contrast to the statutory “benefit” moniker, which can

351. See Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed, supra note 260, at 105
(warning that by “perpetuat[ing] the misconception that current corporate law requires
directors to focus solely on . . . share price maximization,” benefit corporation statutes will
“undermine[] the promotion of socially responsible decision-making by corporate
boards”); Robson, supra note 272, at 552–53 (warning that the advent of benefit
corporations might lead socially conscious conventional businesses to “do less,
constraining what has been a steady, if unspectacular, acknowledgment of social
responsibility by traditional for-profits”); Tu, supra note 21, at 174 (warning that “added
complexity and reinforcement of the profit maximization norm [created by benefit
corporation statutes] may collectively lead to an overall reduction in the advancement of
social missions by [conventional] corporations”).
352. See Blount & Nunley, supra note 343, at 311 (“[T]here is no added transparency
or branding benefit to consumers or investors created by [benefit corporations] that
cannot be gained by any other [conventional entity] through simply engaging in annual
social responsibility reporting audited by an established third party.”); Molk, supra note
109, at 249 (“Clearly . . . , there is potential for certification systems to work without the
existence of organizational forms designed specifically for social enterprise.”); Murray,
Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 448 (“[M]uch of the signaling benefit [that
comes from organizing as a benefit entity] can be achieved through mere B certification
from B Lab, while the legal issues can be dealt with in traditional LLC operatingagreement language.”); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 2, at 45 (“A flexible
corporate code, coupled with a meaningful private brand (such as, perhaps, B Lab’s B

97 N.C. L. REV. 603 (2019)

2019]

BENEFIT LLCs

669

be claimed by any business without accountability for that claim, a
private certification will typically entail some degree of verification or
auditing by the certifying organization.353 For example, B Corporation
certification requires a business to not only earn a qualifying score on
B Lab’s proprietary B Impact Assessment but also to provide B Lab
confirming documentation and to submit to a site visit.354 In this
respect, a private certification like B Corporation sends a more
credible signal about a business’s public benefit than the business’s
own, self-serving claims.355
Indeed, a cynic might surmise that B Lab’s advocacy for benefit
corporation legislation has been motivated, at least in part, by its
desire to channel more businesses to its proprietary B Corporation
certification.356 Although B Lab is a nonprofit, the more businesses
ascribe to its certification system, the greater influence B Lab and its
principals enjoy to dictate their own particular vision of social good
onto others. But if the aim, or even the effect, of benefit entity
legislation is to channel more businesses to the private certification of
a Philadelphia-based nonprofit, then that is surely not an appropriate
use of state power. Socially minded businesses hoping to distinguish
themselves in the marketplace can seek B Lab’s certification without
the state’s imprimatur.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the best argument that can be made for benefit LLCs is
that unincorporated businesses should not be excluded from
competitive advantages offered by the state-sponsored “benefit” label
that has already been made available to their corporate counterparts.
And given the widespread adoption of benefit corporation statutes, it
is simply too late to take the statutory “benefit” designation away
from corporations, so it may as well be made available to LLCs.357
Corp certification), could meet and exceed the stated goals of the benefit corporation
statute.”).
353. See Molk, supra note 109, at 250–51 (describing the incentives of a third-party
certifier to ensure the accuracy of its certification); Murray, Choose Your Own Master,
supra note 2, at 45 (“Private organizations are better equipped than state governments to
build nuanced brands and to police them.”); Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra
note 4, at 363 (“[P]rivate organizations like B Lab are better equipped than the
government to successfully brand social enterprises.”).
354. See Dorff, Assessing the Assessment, supra note 21, at 525 (describing the
documentation and auditing requirements of B Corporation certification).
355. See Molk, supra note 109, at 250–51.
356. See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text.
357. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supra note 7, at 442 (articulating a version
of this argument).
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This argument is pragmatic, but also defeatist. It concedes that
the unneeded and ill-advised innovation of statutory benefit
corporations is irreversible and, therefore, should be allowed to
metastasize into the LLC realm.
When legislatures enact statutes that explicitly authorize certain
businesses to advance public benefit and grant those businesses the
“benefit” label, it creates a false dichotomy.358 It suggests that
conventional corporations and LLCs do not benefit the public, that
such businesses are “detriment” entities. Of course, that is wrong. All
statutory business forms, including conventional corporations and
LLCs, must ultimately benefit the public.359 Otherwise, legislators—
elected representatives of the public—would not have enacted (or
would now amend or repeal) the statutes authorizing their creation.
This fundamental reality is masked by benefit entity legislation.
But if the repeal of existing benefit corporation statutes is
improbable, and if the spread of benefit LLCs is predestined, then it
is the responsibility of legislators to draft or amend these statutes to
create true accountability for businesses that claim the statesponsored “benefit” moniker. Most fundamentally, benefit entity
statutes must give stakeholders other than an entity’s owners say in
the business and its governance.360
Recently, several scholars have made various thoughtful
proposals along these lines. For example, Haskell Murray has
proposed requiring every benefit corporation to adopt a stakeholder
advisory board composed of representatives of various stakeholders
and vested with limited, but enforceable, rights in the governance of
the business.361 Similarly, Alicia Plerhoples has suggested granting
nonshareholder stakeholders enforceable legal rights in the form of a
veto power over certain business decisions as well as standing to bring
benefit enforcement proceedings against a benefit corporation’s

358. See Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 43, at 659.
359. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, SEC Commissioner Hester Price Says Corporate Law
Is Public Interest Law, Which Is True, but I Said It First!, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Oct. 2, 2018), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/10/seccommissioner-hester-pierce-says-corporate-law-is-public-interest-law-which-is-true-but-isaid-it.html [https://perma.cc/5KKD-3EW5].
360. See Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 103, at 792 (“If we believe that
other constituencies should be given more protection within corporation law itself, then
statutes should be adopted giving them enforceable rights that they can wield.”).
361. See Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, supra 204, at 94–105.
Importantly, Professor Murray limits his proposal, recommending that stakeholder
advisory boards be mandatory only for large or publicly traded social enterprises. Id. at
105–06.
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board.362 Taking a different approach, Emily Winston has proposed
every benefit corporation be required to work with nonshareholding
stakeholders to coauthor a concrete public benefit plan that those
stakeholders could later seek to enforce against the business.363
Building on these various proposals, Brett McDonnell has also
emphasized that no one approach will be suitable for all social
enterprises and that stakeholder empowerment must be tailored to an
individual business’s unique circumstances and needs.364
The upshot of all these proposals is that for benefit entity
statutes to accomplish their intended purpose, the law must empower
stakeholders in a way that current benefit entity statutes abjectly fail
to. Otherwise, benefit entities are no different than conventional
entities: beholden to the desires of their owners, which desires may or
may not involve the pursuit of public benefit, whatever that concept
might mean to the owners. In the absence of legislative initiative to
reform benefit entity statutes, the onus is on academics and other
neutrals to pierce through the feel-good rhetoric and educate the
public about the emptiness of the state-created “benefit” designation
and its potential for misuse and abuse.

362. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 127–31 (2015).
363. See Winston, supra note 39, at 1832–40.
364. See Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in
Social Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 84 (2018).
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